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Capitol Hill is bustling with thousands of congressional staffers. Despite their numbers, 
and members readily admitting their reliance on these congressional aides, few scholars 
have turned their attention towards how lawmakers make use of their staffing 
resources or how these choices affect their subsequent legislative behavior and 
effectiveness. This dissertation seeks to quantify staff characteristics and impacts within 
both Representatives’ personal offices and congressional committees using two 
authoritative, comprehensive staff databases. More specifically, this project analyzes 
three unverified assumptions regarding congressional aides, their use, and their impact 
on Capitol Hill. The first assumption is that expertise and influence is generated solely by 
years of experience within congressional offices. The second is that levels of 
  
congressional staff turnover are concerningly high across House offices and that 
lawmakers who experience higher levels of turnover are less legislatively active and 
successful. The final assumption tested within this dissertation is that policy-focused 
aides within congressional committees are the driving forces behind various committee 
outputs such as facilitating committee hearings, reporting out substantive legislation, 
and getting it passed by the chamber. While I find that while these presumptions 
regarding congressional staff are generally true, they are incomplete. When assigning 
the most important issue portfolios to policy aides, members value higher levels of staff 
networking in addition to, and often above, longer tenures on the Hill; alarmingly high 
aide turnover is not as systemic as many observers fear, but offices that do experience 
comparatively high proportions of staffers departing the office are less active and 
successful lawmakers; and finally, committee policy staff are key in producing and 
getting important legislation reported out of committee, but it is more connected senior 
staffers who are essential in getting bills passed by the chamber. In sum, this 
dissertation sheds new light on how the behind-the-scenes work of congressional aides 
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On January 18, 2017 the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) 
Committee held its nomination hearing for Representative Tom Price (R-GA), President 
Trump’s nominee to be Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. 
During the hearing, Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) poignantly questioned Rep. Price about 
a potential conflict of interest for the Congressman. Senator Murphy’s line of 
questioning was as follows:  
 
Sen. MURPHY: On March 8th of 2016, earlier last year, CMS announced a demonstration 
project to lower Medicare reimbursements for Part D drugs. That would've decreased incentives 
for physicians to prescribe expensive brand name medications, and drug companies that were 
affected by this immediately organized a resistance campaign. Two days later, you announced 
your opposition to this demonstration project. One week later, you invested as much as $90,000 
in a total of six pharmaceutical companies. Not five, not seven, six. All six, amazingly, made drugs 
that would've been impacted by this demonstration project. There are a lot of drug companies 
that wouldn't have been affected, but you didn't invest in any of those, you invested in six 
specific companies that would be harmed by the demonstration project. You submitted financial 
disclosures indicating that you knew that you owned these stocks, and then two weeks after 
that, you became the leader in the United States Congress in opposition to this demonstration 
project.1 
 
Congressman Price responded with a simple, yet extremely telling, reply: 
Rep. PRICE: That's good staff work, Senator. 
                                             
 
1 Nomination hearing of Rep. Tom Price to be Health and Human Services Secretary, Jan. 18, 2017, Senate 




That’s it. Senator Murphy quickly moved on in his questioning. He never 
acknowledged his uncomfortable pressing of a fellow member of the United States 
Congress was, in fact, founded on the detailed research carried out by his anonymous 
staffer. Though Sen. Murphy was the one on camera receiving the attention—and credit 
or blame, depending on the viewer—for the questioning of Rep. Price, this interaction 
highlights a reality largely unknown to more passive observers of Congress: much of the 
work done on Capitol Hill is conducted by the staff on behalf of the members. 
Representative Price’s facetious reply was a recognition of this truth, from one member 
of Congress to another. 
For those more familiar with Congress, including journalists, lobbyists, and 
academics, the importance of congressional staff is far better known and acknowledged. 
Through close observation, interviews, and even personal experience, these observers 
recognize that congressional aides are an influential and necessary resource for 
lawmakers to carry out the detailed work required of them as lawmakers.  
And most vitally, members themselves readily admit much of their productivity 
in Congress is dependent on their hired hands. In the Congressional Management 
Foundation (2015a) report Life in Congress: The Member Perspective, members of 
Congress were asked to rate how important particular aspects of their job were to their 
satisfaction and effectiveness as a Representative. Unsurprisingly, ‘Staying in touch with 
your constituents’ was voted the most important aspect with 95 percent of members 
agreeing it is very important.  
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Second place, however, is a bit less predictable. Eighty-nine percent of members 
agreed that ‘Having a high-performing staff’ was very important, beating out the 
importance of ‘Feeling that you are performing an important public service’ and ‘Feeling 
invested in the work you are doing’ (with 84 percent of members agreeing these aspects 
were very important). In fact, more members (85 percent) agreed “Effective 
communication between you and your staff” was more critical to their being a satisfied, 
effective lawmaker. In the eyes of members, more agreed that an effective, high-
performing staff meant more to their job performance than either a personal 
investment in their work or the significance associated with being a public servant.  
As articulated by an eight-term House member, “Having an intelligent, creative, 
and conscientious staff to address matters ranging from constituent concerns or needs 
to policy issues is critical if a Member intends to be effective” (26). This quote highlights 
two implicit features regarding congressional aides from the member perspective. First, 
staffers are largely responsible for executing the varied day-to-day tasks expected of 
every lawmaker, from constituent service to creation and advancement of policy. And 
second, without their hired staff, members have little chance of being effective 
lawmakers. 
Intuitively, political scientists and congressional observers—members included—
know staff matter. As the workloads of members of Congress have steadily increased, 
their reliance on personal staffs has followed suit (Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, and Schickler 
2017; Hall 1998; Hammond 1984, 1996; Leal and Hess 2004; Malbin 1980). Due to a 
seemingly endless list of tasks associated with holding elected office, Representatives 
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are subject to harsh time constraints and turn to their aides to help manage their 
responsibilities. Among other duties, each member’s office is responsible for drafting 
legislative bills and amendments, tracking floor and committee happenings, generating 
and executing a media strategy, responding to constituent requests, district casework, 
fundraising, and managing a busy schedule of public appearances. “The simple fact that 
members have more to do than time in which to do it,” (Malbin 1980, 4) has resulted in 
an increased member reliance on their staffs to carry out a wide variety of functions 
that culminate in running a successful legislative office (Romzek and Utter 1997). 
Though members recognize and readily admit their reliance on congressional 
aides, too few scholars have turned their attention towards how members make use of 
their staffing resources and how these choices affect their subsequent legislative 
behavior and effectiveness. Put directly, despite lawmakers regularly telling journalists 
and scholars they couldn’t adequately perform the duties expected of them except for 
their staff, most studies overlook the important role of aides and instead focus on the 
member as the sole, unitary actor executing each and every action done in his or her 
name. 
 This gap in scholarship is particularly surprising given the number of studies that 
pinpoint the factors that affect congressional behavior and lawmaking effectiveness 
(e.g. (Volden and Wiseman 2014). Academics quantify the varying degrees to which 
Members are successful in generating cosponsors on bills or getting legislation signed 
into law (Bernhard and Sulkin 2013; Fowler 2006; Harbridge 2015; Schiller 1995; Wawro 
2001), for example, but they do so despite a fairly general acceptance that the members 
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aren’t always the ones actually doing the work. More fundamentally, much of the 
congressional literature contends that a lawmaker’s individual goals and priorities help 
explain much of their subsequent behaviors in Congress (Adler and Lapinski 1997; 
Barber 1965; Clapp 1980; Fenno 1973; Fiorina 1989; Mayhew 1974, 2000), yet rarely 
give more than passing attention to the aides hired to help them do so. 
In order to better understand legislative behavior in the congressional context, it 
is imperative that the personal employees tasked with executing many of the day-to-day 
operations of their legislative office merit intense study. Just as it makes sense to look at 
the roles, responsibilities, and experience levels of employees within a small business to 
explain the successes or failures of a private enterprise, the same can be said for staffers 
within congressional offices. Staff matter. How they are used, the positions they hold, 
the duties they execute, and their levels of turnover and experience logically are all 
likely to profoundly affect the results of individual lawmaker offices, as well as Congress 
as an institution.  
 I contend this gap in scholarship in staffing is the result of two main 
miscalculations. First, the vast majority of congressional behavior literature treats 
Representatives as unitary actors (e.g. Schiller 1995; Wawro 2001). The unitary model 
implicitly assumes that the member is responsible for all work conducted in her name, 
from legislative research to organizing town halls to booking radio interviews that help 
connect the lawmaker to constituents. This is assuredly not the case.  
It is true that many actions and results are correctly attributed to each lawmaker 
as an individual. After all, the member is the one giving the speech and casting the vote 
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on the House floor. But, these are often culminating events following many staff-hours 
devoted to preparing for execution on those final actions done by the member. As Rep. 
Price’s response in the opening dialogue of this chapter acknowledges, it is likely that a 
congressional employee conducted the research and had a large part in writing the 
speech and in poring over the legislative and political implications of the members’ vote 
prior to any final action taken by the lawmaker.  
What’s more, an enormous amount of labor done within legislative offices 
involves no real involvement by the member. Tasks such as constituent service 
responses or background research on the economic costs of a legislative proposal are 
executed in the member’s name, often at their urging, but without their direct input. 
They have been delegated. The unitary model of congressional behavior largely ignores 
this behind-the-scenes work of aides in preparation for member action and all but 
dismisses the tasks completed in which the Representative is not involved. Doing so 
neglects much of what is done on behalf of our lawmakers and in assessing their 
effectiveness and decision-making in executing the responsibilities of their office. Thus, 
in order to more fully explain congressional behavior and decisions ultimately made by 
individual lawmakers, more attention should be paid to the aides that support and 
influence those processes. 
The second miscalculation is the degree to which the relevant sub-literatures 
exploring congressional behaviors and outcomes are too strictly siloed, particularly in 
regards to congressional staffing. The sub-literature that does acknowledge and 
highlight the vital role performed by congressional aides typically does not link the 
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actions or characteristics of staff as explanations of pursuing member policy goals or in 
assessing their representational or legislative actions or effectiveness. This is particularly 
surprising given that most observers agree the purpose of staff is to execute work that 
benefits the lawmaker. Instead, and as explained in more detail within the literature 
review found in Chapter 2, early scholarly staffing studies have primarily been 
descriptive and have not been linked to outcomes for lawmakers. These works largely 
show common demographic or occupational attributes of aides, such as gender and 
education levels, across the two chambers or provide detailed descriptions of the 
common responsibilities of aides based on their job titles(Fox and Hammond 1975, 
1977; Hammond 1975; Kammerer 1949, 1951a, 1951b; Kofmehl 1962, 1977; Malbin 
1980). The staffing literature has yet to focus on the importance of how members use 
aides, let alone how their turnover, experience levels, or compensation differences can 
affect congressional outcomes in systematic ways.2 
 A second sub-literature that highlights instances in which aides actually affect 
the legislative process and influence members and their policy attention, even their 
policy decisions. These studies, however, are few in number, and typically rely heavily 
on anecdotal evidence or single case studies where the author follows a proposed piece 
of legislation through the legislative process (e.g., DeGregorio 2010; Hammond 1996; 
                                             
 
2 A number of working papers have begun to delve into these questions. For example, Joshua McCrain’s 
working paper “Legislative Staff and Policymaking” finds that members who devote a higher proportion of 
staff resources to policy positions and employ longer serving policy staff and ultimately sponsor more bills 
and are more effective at advancing them. The working paper can be found at 
http://joshuamccrain.com/McCrain_Staff_Paper.pdf.  
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Malbin 1980; Price 1971, 1978).3 Thus, these studies offer little generalization as to 
which types of staffers garner influential status, how many of them exist in Congress, 
which members or committees they work for, or even how their influence has been 
engendered. Such works are meant to highlight that select staffers effectively serve as 
‘Unelected Representatives’ (Malbin 1980) or ‘unelected issue leaders’ (DeGregorio 
2010; Hammond 1990, 1996), but stop short of empirically and systematically studying 
these aides that so clearly affect legislative activity and outcomes on Capitol Hill.  
This dissertation speaks to these gaps. More specifically, this dissertation seeks 
to better understand how members make use of their staffing resources as well as to 
quantify staff impacts on legislative behavior and success within both Representatives’ 
personal offices and congressional committees. I ask, What characteristics do members 
look for in assigning staff to cover their most important issue areas? Is issue area 
expertise on the part of aides gained solely by longer tenures in Congress? Are certain 
staffers more valuable in authoring legislation while other aides are more essential in 
generating passage coalitions within members’ personal offices and committees? What 
are the effects when members lose higher proportions of their staff to turnover? 
                                             
 
3 Montgomery and Nyhan (2017) is a rare exception in that it provides one of the first empirically 
grounded instances in pinpointing effects of legislative staffers. The authors find that members who hire 
senior staff from other House offices tend to be more similar in both their voting patterns and measures 
of effectiveness than those who do not exchange senior aides. 
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1.1 Approach and methods 
To answer these questions I rely on two novel, comprehensive, and authoritative 
datasets of congressional staff. The first database was constructed using the Spring 2016 
Congressional Yellow Book directory. The directory maintains self-reported information 
on each member of Congress such as committee assignments and caucus memberships. 
Vitally for this project, the Yellow Book also provides details for all staffers employed 
within each office, including their title, location of employment—district office or 
Capitol Hill—employment histories, and the policy issues covered by policy staff. Figure 
1.1 provides a snapshot of Rep. Jared Polis’ (D-CO) D.C. office staff directory. Issue 
portfolios and career histories of each offices’ policy staff collected from the directory 
are the focuses of Chapter 3.  
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The second database is drawn from the House Statement of Disbursements 
(SOD) compiled and recorded by the Chief Administrative Officer of the Committee on 
House Administration. The public quarterly SOD document reports all receipts and 
expenditures for each member, committee, and office within the House of 
Representatives, including monies spent on franked mail, travel, and personnel. Of 
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particular importance for this dissertation, the SOD itemizes payments made to each 
individual staffer, the title held by the aide, the dates in which the payment was 
associated, and the office in which the payment originated. LegiStorm, a private data 
firm, digitizes, cleans, and verifies the SOD submissions. Figure 1.2 presents a sample of 
payments made by the Office of the Majority Leader, Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), reported 
within the 2018 Quarter 1 SOD. Various SOD data from the 107-115th congresses (2001-
2017)—the longest period available to date—are used in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Figure 1.2: Itemized payments from the 2018, Q1 Statement of Disbursements  
 
 
Congressional staff are likely to have broad-ranging effects on individual 
members, congressional committees, and the institution as a whole. As such, I do not 
present a single unifying theoretical framework that applies across to each chapter 
empirical test that is to follow. Instead, each chapter will advance separate arguments 
about the roles and member uses of staff, including relevant theoretical underpinnings 
specific to its specific topic, data, and methodological test. Though relatively 
independent, each chapter will offer a different perspective on how members use their 
aides and what effects staffing decisions have for representation and lawmaking. For 
example, Chapter 3 relies on the established ‘U.S. Congressman as Enterprise’ (Salisbury 
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and Shepsle 1981a, 1981b; Shepsle 1989) framework to show that staffer expertise is 
not solely the function of longer tenures on the Hill, but also a byproduct of being more 
connected to other member offices. In Chapter 4, however, I make use of a turnover 
concept and metric found within the economics and business management literatures 
to show the negative consequences on levels of legislative productivity and 
effectiveness for Representatives who experience higher levels of staff turnover within 
their personal offices. These chapters both speak to the use and importance of staff in 
Congress, but do so using different literatures, theories, data sources, and quantitative 
methods. I contend that these varied data and theories founding each empirical 
chapter—in addition to the study of staff within both House personal and committee 
offices—provide strong evidence for the use and impact of congressional staff that has 
largely gone overlooked in the study of congressional behavior and outcomes. 
1.2 Project motivation 
Despite limited scholarly interest in congressional staffing, particularly in recent 
years, there is a growing body of aide-focused research being conducted outside of 
academia, largely by think-tanks writing through a lens of good government initiatives. 
The work almost uniformly draws attention to the real normative concerns that stem 
from troubling staffing patterns highlighted from private organization surveys (e.g., 
Congressional Management Foundation 2015b). 
 Their claims are simple and uniform. In recent decades, lawmakers have 
experienced dramatic growths in both the populations they represent and in the 
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number of policy domains they are expected to address (Davidson et al. 2013; Sinclair 
1990), all while staff levels have remained stagnant in the Senate and declining in the 
House (Brookings Institution). As a result, many fear Congress, as an institution, cannot 
possibly be expected to perform all of its required duties given current staffing 
resources (Kramer 2017). What’s more, the aides that members do employ are argued 
to maintain strikingly short congressional tenures and turnover at an alarmingly fast 
rate. Multiple surveys point to the relatively low salaries offered to congressional aides, 
particularly compared to private consulting and lobbying firms, as the main culprit for 
why staffers find employment outside of Congress (Drutman 2016). 
 Such a constantly high required rate of replacement decreases levels of 
institutional memory as fewer long-serving aides generate experience levels that 
translate into true policy expertise that previous studies show members have 
traditionally relied on. Instead, more junior aides, and their member-bosses, more 
regularly turn to congressional leaders—one of the few legislative branch operations 
that have enjoyed increased staff— to craft and advance legislation behind closed doors 
(Curry 2015). Or, members and staff defer to the comparably well-resourced executive 
branch4 and its agencies to enforce, even write, policy, and increasingly rely on lobbyists 
and ideologically consistent think-tanks to make up for the informational disadvantages 
                                             
 
4 In 2015, Congress employed a total of—including both House and Senate and committees within each 
chamber—17,522 full-time staff (Brookings Institution). In comparison, the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) reports the total number of full-time employees employed by executive branch 
cabinet agencies in FY2017 was 1,848,495, over 10 times more than professional staff in Congress. OPM 
data available at, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-
employment-reports/reports-publications/sizing-up-the-executive-branch-2016.pdf  
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they face (Drutman and Teles 2015; LaPira and Thomas 2017). Put simply, from the 
vantage point of these non-academic observers, too few employees, paid too little, who 
turnover far too often, ultimately result in a concerning decrease in Congress’ capacity 
to do its own work. 
 This project is largely motivated by these normative concerns. Informed 
evaluations to normative questions depend heavily on empirical pursuits, many of which 
have yet to be fully executed. In other words, despite general acceptance from many 
who know Congress well, assumptions regarding congressional staff, including member 
use of their aides, remain unsubstantiated. This study provides important quantitative 
work in an effort to connect the normative concerns largely found outside of academia 
and scholarly theoretical work focusing on why Congress works the way it does. Some of 
the findings presented in this dissertation—such as the fear that congressional staffer 
turnover is a systemic problem across most lawmaker offices—goes against 
conventional congressional capacity expectations. Most, however, support the notion 
that congressional aides are a primary resource to members and Congress as an 
institution and matter a great deal to fulfilling the many roles expected of the First 
Branch. 
1.3 Dissertation outline 
The next chapter provides a brief discussion of the evolution of staffing 
resources in Congress, including the major legislative initiatives which provided 
increased aides to members and summary trends and changes regarding their numbers. 
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It also provides a present-day look at common staffing patterns within personal House 
offices. Finally, Chapter 2 includes a review of the relevant congressional staffing 
literature, focusing on previous works that have detailed instances in which aides have 
had influenced the legislative process and the policy decisions of their boss. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the characteristics members seek in assignment of 
legislative issue portfolios to their policy aides. Congressional observers assume that 
members logically assign the most prestigious and intricate issues to the aides who have 
more years of congressional experience. I find this to be generally true, but incomplete. 
In addition to longer tenures on the Hill, I show congressional staffers who have more 
extensive Hill networks—operationalized by higher counts of different lawmaker offices 
worked in—are most likely to be assigned important legislative issues even after 
controlling for the number of years in which the aide has worked on the Hill. These 
findings suggest that issue area expertise and influence are not solely a function of 
longer staff tenures, but also the degrees to which aides are able to generate coalitions 
because of their connectedness to other congressional offices and outside stakeholders. 
Chapter 4 shows the importance of congressional staff by measuring the 
negative consequences resulting from an office losing its employees to turnover. In this 
chapter, I detail how and why Representatives are less successful in authoring and 
advancing policy when experiencing high levels of staff turnover within their personal 
offices and present the first empirical tests of the effects of staffer turnover on their 
legislative activity and effectiveness as lawmakers. Relying on a unique metric of staff 
turnover found within the economics and business management literatures, I show that 
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Representatives who experience higher proportions of salaries that depart their 
legislative enterprise subsequently sponsor and cosponsor fewer policy proposals and 
are less successful at advancing substantive legislation through the various stages of the 
legislative process.  
Chapter 5 turns to staffing resources housed within congressional committees. 
This chapter assesses the extent to which increases in staff drive legislative productivity 
in committees, and which types of staffers are most consequential at various stages of 
the legislative process. I argue and find committee staffers are crucial drivers of 
legislative productivity for the committees in which they work and that certain staffers 
are better-positioned than others to make a legislative impact in committees. The 
findings suggest that policy staffers are crucial to the early legislative process of 
producing quality legislation out of committee but that well-connected senior staffers 
are the necessary forces behind their successful passage out of the chamber. 
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by discussing broader implications of the 
project’s findings as well as its contributions to the studies of congressional behavior 
and legislative productivity. The chapter also details potential avenues of research on 
the topic of congressional staff and capacity. Finally, I discuss several normative 
questions and concerns regarding congressional staffing using this dissertation’s findings 










Capitol Hill used to look far different. It used to be much quieter. The mass of white 
marble House and Senate office buildings filling out the modern U.S. Capitol complex 
weren’t yet constructed. Until 1933, the House and Senate only had one office building 
each. Prior to then, all member offices were housed within the Capitol building itself. 
During this time, lawmakers had few, if any, staff to assist them in running their offices. 
Lawmakers were the office. 
In fact, it wasn’t until 1893 that House members were appropriated 
congressional funds towards hiring staff help, and even then, each lawmaker was 
authorized only one clerk. During this era Representatives regularly relied on unpaid 
assistance, often from family or dedicated friends, to help with their representational 
duties. Or members hired a secretary out of their own pockets to aid members in 
drafting and sending constituent correspondence. Clearly, things have changed. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the major reform and legislative 
initiatives that produced the present-day Capitol Hill environment bustling with the 
quick-paced, well dressed aides with which congressional observers are now familiar. 
Next, I describe the appropriated allowance members receive that funds the salaries for 
their hired employees, and detail congressional staffing patterns and modern office 
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structures found within the House of Representatives. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a review of the congressional staff literature to outline what scholarly inquiries to-
date have taught us in regards to the roles and influence of congressional aides. 
2.1 Evolution of staff resources in Congress 
2.1.1 Legislative Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970 
1946 LRA 
In response to criticisms that Congress was failing to live up to its designated role as a 
coequal branch in our system of government, the institution sought to reform and 
modernize itself. In that effort, H. Con. Res. 18 was passed on February 19, 1945, 
establishing the bipartisan Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (JCOC). 
Made up of three Democrats and three Republicans from each chamber, chaired by Sen. 
Robert M. LaFollette (R-WI), the JCOC was directed to study various aspects of House 
and Senate organization and procedures. The committee’s directive was quite broad:  
 
“The committee shall make a full and complete study of the organization 
and operation of the Congress of the United States and shall recommend 
improvements in such organization and operation with a view toward 
strengthening the Congress, simplifying its operations, improving its 
relations with other branches of the United States Government, and 
enabling it better to meet its responsibilities under the Constitution.”5 
 
                                             
 
5  H. Con. Res. 18. 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (February 19, 1945). Sec. 2.  
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Between March 13 and June 29, 1945, the committee held four executive 
sessions, 39 public hearings, heard testimony from 102 witnesses— 45 of whom were 
members of Congress—and reviewed dozens of submitted written statements from 
interested private citizens. The JCOC explained, “To all these proposals we have applied 
the simple test: Will they strengthen Congress and enable it to do a better job?”6 
 On March 4, 1946 the JCOC submitted its final report recommending a wide 
array of changes for Congress. Among others, the JCOC recommendations included: 
reducing the number, and reorganizing the jurisdictions, of congressional committees in 
both chambers; granting committees subpoena power in order to perform more 
effective oversight; changes to the congressional schedule; and the requirement that all 
bills passed out of committee be brought to the floor for consideration. 
 But surprising to many, “The lack of skilled staffs for the committee work-shops 
of Congress was more complained of than perhaps any other matter before” the 
committee.7 The JCOC report cautioned, “The shocking lack of adequate congressional 
fact-finding services and skilled staffs sometimes reaches such ridiculous proportions as 
to make Congress dependent upon “hand-outs” from Government departments and 
private groups or newspaper stories for its basic fund of information on which to base 
legislative decisions.”8  
                                             
 
6  H. Rept. 1675. 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946), p. 1. 
7 Ibid., p. 9. 
8 Ibid., p. 9. 
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To that end, the JCOC recommended several changes in regards to congressional 
staffing, particularly within committees, which were later codified upon President 
Truman’s signing of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 19469 on August 2, 1946. More 
specifically, the 1946 LRA authorized the hiring of four professional staff for each 
committee, and granted each chamber’s Appropriations Committee to set their own 
staffing levels. These “staff experts” were to be hired based on merit rather than 
patronage, paid a salary “large enough to command a high level of technical skill,” work 
solely on committee business, and were expected to perform their duties on a 
nonpartisan basis and for all committee members. Additionally, the 1946 LRA 
authorized the hiring of up to six clerical workers per committee and allowed for the 
temporary employment of additional investigatory staff. In granting these increased 
staff resources, Congress took the first step to institutionalize permanent in-house staff 
in order to provide for “a pure and unbiased stream of information… necessary for the 
making of sound decisions.”10 The JCOC and subsequent 1946 LRA made it clear: in 
order for members, and Congress, to adequately respond to the demands of their office, 
they needed more staff assistance. 
1970 LRA 
In spite of the many changes resulting from the 1946 LRA, calls for further congressional 
reforms and modernizations continued with many themes from the 1940s being echoed 
                                             
 
9 P.L. 79-601. 
10 H. Rept. 1675. 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1946), p. 14. 
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into the mid 1960s. Most notable was the fear that Congress remained ill-equipped and 
unable to adequately perform the duties expected of it and was increasingly ceding 
power and legislating authority to the Executive Branch. Reformers charged that the 
institution remained poorly organized, inaccessible, and lacked vital resources, all while 
populations and the number of issue areas under congressional purview were surging.11 
As put by Sen. Michael Monroney (D-OK) in 1965, Congress was attempting to operate 
the country’s biggest business “with machinery as obsolete as a quill pen, a slanting 
bookkeeper’s desk, and an old-fashioned high stool.”12 
 Thus, on March 11, 1965, Congress established a second bipartisan Joint 
Committee on the Organization of Congress. The 1965 JCOC was modeled explicitly after 
the first, both in membership structure—12 members, six from each chamber, equally 
divided by party— and in mandate—the committee was to “Make a full and complete 
study of the organization and operation of the Congress of the United States and shall 
recommend improvements in such organization and operation with a view toward 
strengthening the Congress.”13  
Over 40 days of hearings from March 10 to September 23, 1965, the second 
JCOC heard testimony from 199 witnesses, many of whom were sitting members of 
                                             
 
11 Vitally, reform efforts were also instigated by frustrations with Southern Democratic committee 
chairman who stymied legislative action favored by more progressive members, including some liberal 
Republicans. Rep. Richard Bolling (D-MO) highlighted such procedural and institutional roadblocks, as well 
as offered recommendations for congressional reform in his two books House Out of Order (1965) and 
Power in the House (1968). 
12 Joe Hall, “Congress to Try Again to “Modernize””. Gettysburg Times. April 30, 1965. Available at, 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=siwmAAAAIBAJ&sjid=H_4FAAAAIBAJ&pg=7.  
13 S. Con. Res. 2, 89th Cong, 1st Sess. (March 11, 1965). 
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Congress. On July 28 of the following year, the committee issued its final report 
containing over 120 recommendations.14 Though the recommendations were put to 
legislative language in 1966, it took until 1970—and several more hearings and 
testimonies from sitting members—to pass the House with amendments. On October 8, 
1970, President Nixon signed the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 into law.15 
Similar to 1945 JCOC and 1946 LRA, the changes resulting from the 1970 LRA 
were wide-ranging, but many changes from the latter were intended to curtail the 
power of Southern Democratic committee chairman. Among others, suggested reforms 
included: the mandate that business meetings of House and Senate standing 
committees be open to the public unless a majority of members voted for privacy; the 
requirement that committees set regular meeting schedules; the requirement for 
committees to publish roll call votes; an amendment to House Rules to allow recorded 
roll call votes within the Committee of the Whole; and major alterations to the 
congressional budget process, such as the requirement that the President’s budget 
submission include five fiscal years instead of one. 
 And just like in 1945 staffing resources were addressed. Specifically, the 1970 
LRA provided an increase from four to six professional staffers for each committee, and 
authorized committees to hire additional consultants, investigators, as well as other 
contract or temporary workers. Notably, though the mandate that committee staff be 
nonpartisan in their work continued, the 1970 LRA allotted one-third of the committee’s 
                                             
 
14 S. Rept. 1414, 89th Cong. 2nd Sess. (July 28, 1966). 
15 P.L. 91-510. 
 23 
employees to the minority party, the first such instance in delineating staffing resources 
by party on committees. 
2.1.2 Staff within House and Senate Personal Offices 
During this same period lawmakers in both chambers argued that it wasn’t just 
committees that needed increased staffing resources; Representatives’ and Senators’ 
personal offices were also struggling to keep up with their growing workloads and 
demands. Prior to the 1940s, member personal staff resources were minimal. Only in 
1893 was each member of the House appropriated funds for a single clerk; prior to then, 
any staff assistance was paid for out of the lawmaker’s pocket. Staff authorizations for 
Representatives increased to two per lawmaker in 1919 where they remained until a 
third staffer was authorized in 1940 (1975, 115). In the Senate, personal staff were 
authorized in 1885, and in 1910 each non-chairman Senator was authorized two staff. In 
1914, the number was upped to three per Senator, and grew to an average of five staff 
per senator in 1940. 
Beginning in 1945—as the first JCOC was recommending committee staff 
increases—House and Senate personal offices were regularly authorized more staff with 
appropriations independent of the 1946 LRA. In 1945, each House member’s personal 
staff allowance doubled from three to six, was increased to eight in 1955, and upped to 
10 by 1965 (115-116). In 1975, the House approved its final staff authorization increase 
to a maximum of 18 full-time employees, where it has remained since. Personal offices 
within the Senate followed a similar trajectory. In 1910, each senator was allotted two 
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staff, three in 1914, five by 1940, and eight staff per senator in 1947. Starting in 1948, 
the Senate transitioned from limiting the number of authorized staff per senator to a 
provided allowance, or limit on amount of funds spent on staff, a practice that continues 
today. 
Figure 2.1. Number of congressional staff within personal offices and committees, 
House and Senate, 1930-2015 
 
Data Source: Brookings Institution, Vital Statistics on Congress, Chapter 5 
 
Figure 2.1 plots the number of staffers in House and Senate personal offices and 
committees from 1930 through 2015. The two years in which the LRAs were signed into 
law are identified with dotted vertical lines. The figure shows the modest staff increases 
across all offices prior to the reform efforts beginning in 1945, after which a sharp 
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increase—particularly within personal offices—occurs as lawmakers were authorized 
staff increases throughout the two decades. Even sharper increases occurred in the 
years immediately following the 1970 LRA. The House of Representatives enjoyed the 
largest increases in raw number of staff, surging from 870 staffers in 1935 to 1,440 in 
1947, to 7,067 in 1979 (Vital Statistics on Congress Data on the U.S. Congress 2018). The 
number of House staff peaked in 1989 at 7,920 and has since decreased to a 2015 total 
of 6,030, nearly a 24% drop during the period.16 Such sudden growth in congressional 
staff was found to alter traditional member-to-member interactions on the Hill. As 
observed by Kenneth Shepsle, “The rubbing of elbows [by members] was replaced by 
liaisons between legislative corporate enterprises, usually at the staff level. Surrounded 
or protected by a bevy of clerks and assistants, members met other members only 
occasionally and briefly on the chamber floor or in committee work” (1989, 242). 
2.2 Present day staffing in the House 
2.2.1 The Members’ Representational Allowance 
In order to operate their personal offices, each member of the House is granted an 
annual appropriation known as the Members’ Representational Allowance (MRA). The 
MRA was first authorized in 1996 and consolidated member allowances— such as the 
                                             
 
16 Though staffing decreases in the House began in the late 1980s, declines are more prominent, 
particularly within House Committees, as a result of Speaker Newt Gingrich’s (R-GA) “Contract With 
America.” After Republicans won a House majority in 1994, Speaker Gingrich led efforts to cut the number 
of House committees by one third as well as eliminate the same proportion of committee staff as a means 
of shrinking the “permanent staff” bureaucracy in Congress (Gingrich, et al. 1994). 
 26 
official mail and personal office expenses allowances—that were previously 
independent.17 According to the Members’ Congressional Handbook, the MRA is 
“available to support the conduct of official and representational duties to the district 
from which he or she is elected.”  
As such, the MRA is used to pay for official office expenses including personnel 
salaries and benefits, office supplies, travel, and district office rental, among other 
items. MRA funds cannot be used for social or campaign activities, and the member is 
personally responsible for repayment of any expenditures in excess of those 
appropriated to his or her office. The appropriated amount granted to each member 
depends on the distance of the district from Washington—to account for greater travel 
costs—and the number of non-business addresses within the district—to account for 
increased costs in sending official mail. For Fiscal Year 2017, the average MRA was 
$1,315,213 (Brudnick 2017).  
The MRA system grants lawmakers great flexibility in how to structure and 
operate their offices, both on Capitol Hill and in the district. With few limitations, 
choices as to how to spend their appropriated funds, such as how many district offices 
to open or how many caseworkers are necessary to respond to constituent requests, 
rest with the member. It is up to the lawmaker to decide how many flights are necessary 
or how much to spend on official mail back to the district. This spending discretion has 
led some scholars to view each member as the CEO of their personal office, where 
                                             
 
17 P.L. 104-53 (November 19, 1995). 
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members are the final arbiter of spending decisions within their individualized legislative 
enterprise (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981a, 1981b; Shepsle 1989). Moreover, scholars have 
viewed the variation in member spending decisions via their individualized MRA as a 
means of explaining their priorities and different representational styles (Fenno 1973; 
Loomis and Schiller 2018; Mayhew 1974; Parker and Goodman 2009) and as an 
explanation for the incumbency advantage of sitting members (Cox and Katz 1996). 




Data Source: House Statement of Disbursements 
 
How then do members spend their MRA? Figure 2.2 plots the average 
percentage of MRA spending on various categories from 2009 through 2017. The figure 
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makes clear that the vast majority of Representatives’ MRA spending—77.7 percent 
during the time period—is put towards their staff, with very little variation year over 
year. The category with the second highest average of MRA monies spent is on rent and 
utilities for district offices at seven percent. All other categories each represent less than 
five percent of MRA fund expenditures.  
2.2.2 How do Representatives staff their offices? 
The flexibility Representatives enjoy in deciding what to spend MRA funds on also 
extends on who they choose to spend them on. Members hire and fire aides at their 
own volition; they choose to hire in district offices or on Capitol Hill; they have the 
freedom to assign job titles and specific legislative portfolios to their employees, as well 
as the ability to change them without cause or justification; and Representatives are 
authorized to set the salaries of staffers in their office at their discretion so long as 
individual salaries do not exceed the $168,411 maximum. Under the MRA, Members 
face two main constraints by statute: they may not employ more than 18 full-time aides 
and up to four part-time employees at any one time, and they may not spend more than 
allotted to their personal offices through the MRA each calendar year. Beyond these 
restrictions, staffing decisions are completely under the direction of the Representative.  
 With such a heavy concentration of MRA spending on congressional staff 
salaries, questions as to how members actually decide to staff their personal offices 
quickly follow. The short answer to questions as to how members staff their offices: it 
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varies. Some members choose to commit much of their resources to policy positions 
within their D.C. office while others make district-based positions a top priority.  
 
 
Table 2.1. Variance in staffing allocations of two members as of Spring, 2016 (114th 
Cong.) 
Rep. Bennie Thompson (MS-02) Rep. Bobby Scott (VA-03) 
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Consider the two personal offices of Representatives Bennie Thompson (D-MS) 
and Bobby Scott (D-VA), for example. Table 2.1 presents the position titles for all 
staffers within each office taken from the Spring 2016 Congressional Yellowbook. 
Several distinct differences are clear. First, Rep. Scott employs only 13 aides while Rep. 
Thompson has 17. Second, Rep. Scott employs seven policy staffers, with a Legislative 
Director as a seventh, though the role is split as Communications Director. Conversely, 
Rep. Thompson only has two aides dedicated to policy, and one of them concurrently 
serves as Counsel. Finally, Rep. Thompson employs eight constituent service staffers 
while Rep. Scott has zero. This comparison makes clear that Reps. Thompson and Scott 
make wildly different use of their staffing resources, Thompson valuing constituent 
service in his office, Scott policy work in his. No matter their reasonings, the two 




Figure 2.3. Average percent of House staff in Washington, D.C., and district offices, 
1976-2016 
 
Data Source: Brookings Institution, Vital Statistics on Congress 2018, Chapter 5 
 
Though variation exists between members in the number and job responsibilities 
assigned to staff, trends and averages are valuable in understanding the evolution and 
current patterns of staff employment within the House. For example, Figure 2.3 plots 
the average percent of House personal staff working in D.C. and district offices from 
1976 to 2016. The figure makes clear that since the mid 1970s lawmakers have shifted 
more of their staffing resources off of Capitol Hill to district offices. In 1976, 28 percent 
of congressional aides worked in the district. By 1985 that percentage had grown to 38 
percent and in 2004 over half of congressional aides were employed in offices outside of 
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D.C. for the first time, peaking in 2005 with 50.7 percent. In 2016, 47 percent of staff 
were employed off of Capitol Hill. 
 What is the breakdown of staff responsible for the varied job duties within a 
current House office? In other words, of the maximum 18 full-time staff allowed, how 
many staff are devoted to essential House personal office functions, such as policy or 
communications? Figure 2.4 provides box plots of the proportions of staff resources 
allocated to various position groupings within House offices. These data were generated 
by collecting each staffer’s job title listed in every Representative’s office within the 
Spring 2016 Congressional Yellowbook. Based on these titles, staffers were grouped into 
one of five categories: administrative; communications; constituent service; policy; or 
senior staff. The proportions were created by dividing the sum of the number of staffers 
in each category by the total number of staffers employed by the lawmaker’s office. 
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Figure 2.4. Average percent of staff allocated to various position groupings, 2016 
 
Data Source: Congressional Yellowbook, Spring 2016 
  
Figure 2.4 shows job titles carrying constituent service responsibilities (e.g., 
caseworker or constituent service representative) represent the position grouping with 
the highest median proportion of staff devoted to such tasks with 35.5 percent. Policy 
positions (e.g., legislative assistant) represent 27 percent of staff positions, and 
communications titles (e.g., press secretary and communications director) make up nine 
percent of staff in the House offices. Administrative (e.g., secretary and staff assistant) 
and leadership positions (e.g., chief of staff) each represent 15 percent of staff 
allocations.   
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By extrapolating these proportions to the number of individuals assigned to the 
five common position groupings, the representative 2016 House office is staffed in the 
following manner: 
● Two to three leadership staffers; typically a Chief of Staff and a District 
Director 
● Five to six constituent staffers; typically several Caseworkers, a Field 
Representative, and a Grants Coordinator 
● Four to five policy staffers; typically a Legislative Director and three 
Legislative Assistants 
● One to two communications staffers; typically a Communications Director 
and a Press Secretary 
● Two to three administrative staffers; typically a Scheduler, a Staff 
Assistant, and an Office Manager 
 
As the staffing differences between Reps. Bobby Scott and Bennie Thompson in 
Table 2.1 highlight, lawmakers vary in their staffing priorities across position types. 
Figure 2.4 plots these differences in member staffing choices by showing each position 
grouping distribution and variation. Each position group’s box within the figure shows 
the interquartile range in proportion devoted to such duties, indicating the respective 
proportions half of all Representatives devote to each group.  Consider policy positions, 
for example. Half of members devote between 22 percent and 32 percent of their staff 
positions with constituent service responsibilities. But, as shown by the whiskers 
extending in either direction from the box dots indicating statistical outliers18, legislative 
proportions range from a minimum of 12.5 percent to a maximum of 54 percent. The 
figure highlights that while there are fairly average office structures within the House, 
                                             
 
18 A statistical outlier is defined by 1.5 times the interquartile range. 
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lawmakers do vary, sometimes considerably, from their colleagues in what position 
groups receive the bulk of their MRA funds. 
2.3 Literature review: What we know about congressional staff 
Surprisingly, this level of detailed descriptive understanding of how members allocate 
their staffing resources, is not commonly found in academic works on congressional 
staff. Despite their large numbers and acknowledged importance in the day-to-day 
operation of congressional offices, congressional scholars have not devoted much 
attention to congressional aides, particularly in recent decades. Instead, nearly all 
scholarly congressional staffing inquiries fit into two broad categories of explanation. 
These two categories are: (1) discussion of the personal characteristics of staffers and 
describing their job responsibilities, and (2) explaining the role of staff in the policy 
process. These two perspectives merit separate review because they make up the bulk 
of the congressional staffing literature. 
2.3.1 Who are congressional staffers? 
Much of the early work studying congressional aides from the 1940s through the 1970s 
highlights the characteristics of the behind-the-scenes actors on Capitol Hill, using 
staffers as the units of analysis. Such descriptive work was necessary. At the time, 
Congress had recently seen an explosion in the number of aides available to Members 
and committees, yet no scholarly inquiry had attempted to discern the types of people 
that filled the relatively new roles. Several studies published soon after the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 (LRA) proved valuable because they offered some of the first 
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counts of total staffers serving in each chamber and as committee aides. These studies 
also provided the staff titles held and wages earned at the time (Galloway 1946, 1951, 
1953).  
Other early studies focused on their common demographic attributes, 
backgrounds, and career paths to offer explanations of how Congress worked from the 
inside. Using staff interviews predominantly of committee aides, Kammerer (Kammerer 
1949, 1951a, 1951b) gave early insight into staffer demographics and hiring and 
turnover patterns within Congress. Similar to other early works on staff demographics 
and characteristics, Kammerer makes sweeping claims based on her research. For 
example, she writes, “The ‘Hill’ career employee, who has usually served his 
apprenticeship as a secretary in a Representative’s or Senator’s office, adjusts best to 
the peculiar atmosphere of committee administration. Often he has studied law at night 
during his period of apprenticeship” (1951b, 1131). Moreover, Kammerer (1951b) does 
not shy away from suggesting that committees vary greatly in the competency of 
committee staffers. She urges all committees to value expertise, education, and 
experience in committee aides far above any consideration of partisan affiliation of their 
potential employees. 
Kofmehl’s Professional Staffs of Congress (1962) examines the three congresses 
immediately following the 1946 LRA and provides the first thorough look at the roles 
and backgrounds of staffs of senators and congressional committees. Kofmehl updated 
his book twice, with the latest version (1977) including developments in staffing 
stemming from the 1970 LRA. Through systematic interviews, the author provides one 
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of the first detailed reviews of the education and professional backgrounds of Senate 
personal and committee staffers. For example, he gathered data on the number of aides 
with various college degrees or counts of staffers previously serving in the executive 
branch and in the same field as handled by their committee. Perhaps more illuminating, 
Kofmehl asserts that “neither educational nor experience backgrounds are as 
important...as the possession of certain abilities and other characteristics” (1977, 88). In 
this vein, he itemizes the ‘essential attributes’ of capable aides, suggesting that a 
successful staffer “must be fundamentally a generalist,” have the “ability to see 
interrelationships,” “a suitable temperament,” and “must be able to operate well under 
pressure” (88-91). 
 The next wave of scholarly research centered on identifying variation among 
staff demographics and characteristics, most often using job titles as the differentiator. 
Using responses from interviews with House staffers serving in the 92nd Congress, 
Hammond (1975) begins to highlight discrete differences in educational attainment, 
ages, and tenures based on specific positions within legislative offices. For example, 
Hammond states, “Administrative assistants are older than other personal staff 
professionals; their average tenure is nine years, in contrast for 2.3 years for legislative 
aides” (Hammond 1984, 278). Her work was foundational in presenting early typologies 
of congressional staffers, as well as stating that variation in staffer characteristics and 
talents ultimately leads to variation in the legislative productivity within lawmakers. 
Kofmehl (1977) conducts a similar analysis of congressional committee staff 
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demographics, Walsh (1976) on Senate aides, and Balutis (1975) details variation in 
state level aides using New York state as a case study. 
 Fox and Hammond’s Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American 
Lawmaking made one of the first systematic efforts “to delineate salient attributes and 
to sketch a “profile” of staff aides” (1977, 33). Based on over 1,000 responses to a 
survey of House, Senate, and committee staffs, the authors make broad 
characterizations of the typical legislative aide by position. For example, “The average 
Senate personal office professional staff member maintains his legal residence in his 
Senator’s home state; earns over $24,000 a year; is male, 38.5 years old; and has a 
college degree with some graduate work” (33). Additionally, the survey was one of the 
first to detail the partisan leanings of staffers. Fox and Hammond find that over 75% of 
House, Senate, and committee aides held ‘strong’ or ‘very strong’ party preferences 
(Table 7, 174), and the vast majority of staffers share the same political leanings as their 
member of Congress boss. Malbin (1980) similarly offers profiles of personal and 
committee staffers, in addition to focusing on the goals of staffers in pursuing work on 
Capitol Hill and subsequent career options that result from their legislative service. 
Herrnson (1994) argues the training staffers receive as congressional aides results in a 
head start towards becoming elected Members of the House themselves. 
 After the 1970s, though with a few exceptions that spoke to hiring imbalances 
on the basis of sex and race, descriptive studies became sparse. Friedman and 
Nakamura (1991) provide quantitative support to the normative concern that women 
were not assuming influential positions within congressional committees at the same 
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rates of men. The authors found that while women had made gains since the studies of 
Fox and Hammond (1977) in the number of women hired, the tenures of females on 
committees were shorter than males. Moreover, men still held a far disproportionate 
number of top posts, such as chief of staff and legislative director.  
Turning to questions of minority hiring, Grose, Mangum, and Martin (2007) show 
that Members representing majority-minority districts mainly staff their district offices 
with African-American staffers. Relatedly, Ziniel (2009) finds that African-American aides 
are more likely to hold positions in Member districts rather than Capitol Hill offices. 
Thus, their focus is on constituent service rather than on policy and procedural matters 
associated with work on Capitol Hill.  
2.3.2 Roles, duties, and influence 
For scholars interested in congressional staffing, a logical evolution took place in the 
literature from descriptive works on who staffers are to those describing what they do. 
Due in part to the previously-noted expansion of Congress’s issue portfolio and number 
of policy responsibilities, most scholars came to agree on “the simple fact that members 
have more to do than time in which to do it” and that aides increasingly were hired to 
help Members deal with the litany of responsibilities that came with their elected 
positions (Malbin 1980, 4). Political observers noted that the increase in staff functions 
and responsibilities has had direct impact on the lawmakers’ ability to manage their 
heavy workload given increases in constituency populations, the size and role of 
government, and other factors (Hall, 1998; Hammond, 1984, 1996; Leal and Hess 2004; 
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Malbin, 1980). However, whether or how staffers helped lighten the workload of their 
member-bosses provoked varying opinions and observations.  
These differences in observations were largely based on when the studies took 
place, with the earliest works maintaining that staffer assistance largely concerned 
clerical duties and constituent service. For example, based on a series of bipartisan 
panels from the 1959 Brookings Institution Round Table Conference on Congress and 
subsequent Member and staffer interviews, Clapp (1963) found that House members 
turned to congressional aides predominantly for assistance with enormous amounts of 
correspondence and administrative functions. Malbin (1980) found similar general 
usage of staff, though he did note that the increased numbers of staffers per office 
provided by the 1970 LRA corresponded with an increased reliance on aides for district 
offices and constituent services. He writes, “Most personal staff aides do not work on 
legislation” (14), adding further that “From the numbers it seems obvious that most of 
the members’ new personal staff aides do constituency-related work that may help an 
incumbent win reelection but that has little to do with the legislative process” (14). 
Ornstein (1975) draws similar conclusions. 
As the size of government and districts continually grew larger, along with 
increased issue and institutional complexity (see, Davidson, Oleszek, Lee, and Schickler 
2017; Polsby 1968; Wilson 1989), Members turned to aides to help with all aspects of 
their representative duties, including legislation. “Congressmen have come to view staff 
assistance as important to policy formation, to constituent service, and to the power 
acquisition that is central to congressional activity” (Fox and Hammond 1997, 1). In 
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other words, Members increasingly rely on staffers as their principal institutional 
resource to assist in far more than constituent casework. They want their top aides to 
take leadership roles in legislative and communications activities on behalf of their boss.  
The increase in staff allocations and Member reliance on their assistance has led 
some scholars to argue that every individual member of Congress is the leader of a 
legislative enterprise consisting of numerous support staff -- today, upwards of 22 
professional and clerical staff, as well as any number of interns, legislative fellows, and 
volunteers (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981a, 1981b; Shepsle 1989). In this view, Members 
act as Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of their personal offices, retain hiring and firing 
powers, maintain full discretion on employee compensation, assign responsibilities to 
individuals, and provide overall direction to the staff to promote his representative and 
policy goals (Loomis 1979). In the view of Whiteman (1995), “An enterprise perspective 
on congressional decision making begins with the recognition that each enterprise has 
goals, has resources to pursue those goals, and exists in an environment shaped 
primarily by the flow of legislative activity and by the demands of constituents and 
interest groups” (6).  
As divisions of labor became more defined in congressional offices, staff became 
more specialized in the tasks in which they were hired to perform. In this vein, Fox and 
Hammond (1975b) create five staffer typologies based, not on demographics or titles, 
but on the activities and job duties of aides. The authors parse out which staffers 
execute certain aspects of the Members’ official responsibilities: ‘Interactors’ cover 
constituent work, ‘supporters’ handle legislative activities, ‘corresponders’ draft 
 42 
informational materials, ‘advertisers’ handle press operations, and ‘investigators’ 
conduct oversight. More broadly, Romzek and Utter (1997) find that because many 
staffers enjoy “high status, expertise, substantial but qualified autonomy, commitment 
to the political enterprise and public service” they are more aptly described as political 
professionals rather than clerks simply providing administrative support. 
 It is important to note that while there is consensus acknowledgement that a 
large portion—that is, nearly 65%—of congressional aides are devoted to district, 
constituent, and administrative work, scholars became fixated on legislative aides 
because of their close proximity to the production of public policies. They believed that 
these policy-focused aides provided a way of offering deeper explanations of how 
Congress works and how members behave. Put simply, after establishing numerical 
counts by staff roles and descriptions of common office duties, researchers turned their 
attention to aides responsible for assisting Representatives in creating and passing 
public policy. Close observers Congress, often using case studies of how legislation made 
its way through the House and Senate (e.g. Malbin 1980), highlighted the significant role 
of staff policy professionals in lawmaking. Based on personal observations and 
interviews, the predominant assumption within the literature is that members often 
delegated important policy responsibilities to aides for the same simple reason 
lawmakers previously delegated correspondence or constituent service in previous 
decades: the shortage of time for the member to do it themselves.  
Given the high levels of delegation to policy aides, it should come as little 
surprise that the congressional staffing literature regularly finds that aides have an 
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impact on the policy focuses and decisions made by their member-boss (DeGregorio 
1995; DeGregorio and Snider 1995; Fox and Hammond 1977; Hammond 1990, 1996; 
Malbin 1980; Montgomery and Nyhan 2017; Patterson 1970; Price 1971). As articulated 
by Polsby (1990), congressional aides have “extraordinary opportunities to affect public 
policy.”  
2.3.3 Influential staffers 
Not wasn’t all aides, however, acquired such influence. It quickly became clear that 
although many aides held the exact same title, such as ‘Legislative Assistant’ or 
‘Legislative Director,’ the amount of latitude or freedom granted by their Member to act 
on his or her behalf varied greatly. Not all policy aides are ‘unelected issue leaders’ 
(DeGregorio 1996; Hammond 1996; 1990) or ‘unelected Representatives’ (Malbin 1980). 
The challenge for scholars, then, became determining how the policy aides that enjoyed 
influence on policy creation differed from those that didn’t.  
After observing the Senate Commerce, Finance, and Labor and Public Welfare 
Committees in the 88th Congress, Price (1971, 1972) makes an important distinction 
between ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and ‘policy professionals’ and their differing impact on 
legislative outcomes. Price argues that while both sets of staffers maintain expertise in 
their respective legislative areas, the entrepreneur is a policy activist in “continual 
search for policy gaps and opportunities,” particularly on legislation that fits with their 
partisan leanings (1971, 335). Conversely, the policy professional sees his or her role as 
offering policy expertise to all committee members in a more responsive rather than 
activist manner. 
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Kingdon (1981) finds that simply being immersed in the writing of particular bills 
often generates influence by staffers. He writes that “committee staffs and personal 
aides to congressmen who are actively involved in particular pieces of legislation are 
quite important in shaping legislative outcomes” (207-208). Kingdon’s conclusion is 
supported by Maisel (1981) and Hall (1998). Whiteman (1995) argues that the policy 
influence enjoyed by some staffers is the result of both gathering and synthesizing 
policy information, and subsequently mobilizing support for passage across legislative 
offices and outside organizations. Romzek (2000) observes that some staffers are 
granted increased autonomy, even decision-making authority, to act on behalf of their 
Member. Others question whether such authority is granted through issue expertise or 
a proven loyalty to a single member, or both (DeGregorio 1994, 1995; Hammond 1996; 
Jensen 2011). 
2.4 Unanswered questions 
Many such questions regarding member use and the impacts of congressional 
staffers remain largely unanswered, particularly in the modern congressional 
environment. Political observers know staff matter and many qualitative works and case 
studies have highlighted specific instances of staff influence and impact. Yet, modern 
empirically grounded treatments of congressional aides, their roles, and their effects are 
too few in number (Montgomery and Nyhan (2017) being a rare exception). The 
remainder of this dissertation speaks to these questions in a quantitative effort to 
better understand not only how members lead their respective legislative enterprises, 
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but how and how much congressional aides influence the policy making process within 
Congress.  
This dissertation contributes to the existing staffing literature in two principal 
ways. The first is a data and empirical contribution. By using two novel and 
comprehensive datasets of congressional staff employment generated directly from 
member-submitted disbursement records and from the Congressional Yellowbook, this 
project studies staff patterns and effects for a longer period of time—and at a much 
more granular level—than any study to date. Few staff studies have been written in the 
recent past, and even fewer do so using data for longer than one or two congresses at a 
time. Much of this project uses staffer level data going back to the 107th Congress 
(2001-2002), providing both a broad and deep scope through which we can examine the 
importance of congressional staff. 
The second major contribution is to update our theoretical understanding of 
congressional staffing and congressional behavior generally. In part thanks to the 
quantitative leap this project makes, this dissertation places staffers into new contexts 
of the modern Congress. In doing so, we will be better able to understand not just that 
staffers matter generally, but when, where, and how much they matter. Specifically, this 
dissertation tackles three unverified assumptions regarding congressional aides, their 
use, and their impact on Capitol Hill. The first assumption is that expertise and influence 
is generated solely by years of experience within congressional offices. The second is 
that levels congressional staff turnover is concerningly high across House offices and 
that lawmakers who experience higher levels of turnover are less legislatively active and 
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successful. The final assumption tested within this dissertation is that policy-focused 
aides within congressional committees are the driving forces behind various committee 
outputs such as facilitating committee hearings, reporting out substantive legislation, 
and getting it passed by the chamber.  
While I find that while these presumptions regarding congressional staff are 
generally true, they are incomplete. Turnover is not as systematic as many think it is and 
not all committee staffers affect committee outputs in the same way nor at the same 
time. And as the following chapter shows, longer tenures on the Hill is not the reliable 
indicator of issue area expertise for House policy aides. Instead, I find that members also 
value a different type of expertise when deciding which staffers are to be responsible 
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While there seems to be a solid, growing consensus within the staffing literature that 
aides can and do exert influence on their bosses and specific legislative matters, very 
little attention, particularly in recent decades, has been paid to the characteristics of 
those staffers who garner such influential status or in how members vary in their hiring 
of the ones who do. Academics and journalists alike have highlighted instances in which 
key congressional aides have earned the monikers of “unelected issue leaders” 
(Hammond 1996), “Unelected Representatives” (Malbin 1980), or the “101st Senator”19, 
but surprisingly few efforts have been made to quantify the types or levels of expertise 
among staffers who have done so.  
For many observers, staff influence and impact, and thus value to members in 
serving their legislative interests, is assumed to come from longer tenures on the Hill. 
Several superb qualitative works (e.g., Malbin 1980), and much of the congressional 
capacity writings found outside of academia, have produced a narrative that it is longer-
serving aides who are most valuable to lawmakers. This is thought to be particularly true 
                                             
 
19 Kizzia, Tom. 2010. “Obama's likely new staff chief was known as '101st senator.'” Anchorage Daily 
News. June 15, 2015. Available at https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-
government/article24595465.html.  
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when considering legislative staffers responsible for handling specific issue areas in 
support of their member-boss. Policy aides with more experience on the job are 
believed to have developed policy-specific expertise from their years of service that 
translate into a deeper mastery of the issues, their histories and intricate details, and a 
better appreciation of the political landscape and development process.  
Though empirically untested to date, this assumption is likely to be true. Just as 
in other industries, employees generally become more knowledgeable, efficient, and 
proficient in carrying out their duties as they gain experience. One becomes better the 
more one does the job. The industry of legislating is no different. In fact, because the 
language, rules, and customs of the Hill are an environment all of their own with no 
practical training programs prior to becoming an employee, the value of years of 
experience may be even more acute in the business of legislating when compared with 
many other industries.  
I suggest, however, that this tenure narrative misses another essential 
component of the Capitol Hill and policy-making environment: the importance of 
collaborative networks.  This chapter empirically establishes that members of Congress 
value two different types of expertise in the policy aides to whom they delegate their 
most more important policy portfolios. The first type of expertise is the most widely 
accepted form: longer tenures on Capitol Hill. The second form is an indicator of staff 
networking that is so vital to building political and policy coalitions within and outside of 
Congress: the number of different member offices in which an aide has served.  
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Within this chapter, I argue that instead of only looking for the longest-serving 
staffers as a proxy for true policy expertise—as much of the literature and anecdotal 
evidence suggests—members also recognize that effective policy management requires 
coalitions of support and access to multiple sources of information. Thus, members 
assign the most complicated, prestigious, and important legislative issue areas to the 
staffers who have developed the necessary Hill and interest group relationships that 
issue advancement depends upon. Specifically, I ask how much do members of Congress 
value Hill experience, both in the number of years served and number of congressional 
offices worked, in their calculations when assigning legislative portfolios to their 
legislative staffers? Is it true that “Staffs are hired in a haphazard fashion, without any 
formal standards” (Mann and Ornstein 1992, 69)? Or, are members more tactical in that 
they hire and assign more experienced and networked staffers to legislative 
responsibilities where expertise, technical knowledge, and the opportunity for policy 
impact are most valued? Which of these types of experience and expertise matter more 
and on which issues areas? Though some of influence of each of the two measures 
undoubtedly overlap, the methodological approach taken in this chapter allows the 
independent effects of each to be explored. 
To address these lingering questions, I contend that an overlooked line of 
investigation entails identifying the characteristics and experience members value in 
deciding which of their policy aides are to cover their most prioritized issue areas in 
their name. Doing so will help zero in on not only who these ‘unelected issue leaders’ 
are, but also on what issues they lead, and how members take advantage of their levels 
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of experience and networking for their own legislative purposes. Using a novel dataset 
of all personal staff employees of the 114th Congress’ House of Representatives, 
including the legislative issue areas assigned to each, I find that members hire and 
strategically assign their most important policy areas to staffers both with longer 
tenures and those who have proven to be Hill operators by working more legislative 
offices within Congress. In fact, I find that members often care about the number of 
offices policy aides have worked in independently of the staffer’s tenure on the Hill, an 
emphasis that is even more pronounced than tenure for many of the most prestigious 
and policy-laden legislative responsibilities in Congress. 
3.1 The role of legislative staffers 
Delegation of policy attention and action from members to their hired legislative aides 
has become a necessary norm on Capitol Hill. Members have much else to do. Their 
days while in session in D.C. are packed with caucus matters, briefings, meetings with 
constituents and interest groups, media interviews, committee work, fundraising, and a 
litany of other intra-office matters that continually demand their attention (Grim and 
Siddiqui 2013). Thus, lawmakers hire policy staffers to maintain attention to legislative 
developments because they are unable to consistently do so themselves. 
And policy aides20 are tasked with a litany of responsibilities that go far beyond 
monitoring pertinent legislation related to their assigned issue areas or informing their 
                                             
 
20 ‘Legislative staffers’ or ‘policy aides’ are those that have official legislative responsibilities/issues 
assigned as outlined in the Congressional Directory database used within this chapter. Most commonly, 
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member of what issues are on the legislative calendars in the coming days. 
“Increasingly, the members want aides who will dream up new bills and amendments 
bearing their bosses’ names instead of helping the bosses understand what is already on 
the agenda” (Malbin 1980, 7). Legislative staffers are responsible for generating policy 
ideas, drafting legislative language and amendments, briefing the member on the 
legislative history and importance of the issue, preparing committee hearing 
questioning and testimony of called witnesses, and assembling a coalition of other 
supportive members and relevant interest groups (Petersen 2012). Ultimately, the most 
valuable legislative staffers are those who are successfully proactive in identifying and 
promoting legislative opportunities in their member’s name.  
Given the high levels of delegation to policy aides, it should come as little 
surprise that the Congressional staffing literature has regularly found that aides have an 
impact on the policy agendas and decisions made by their member boss (DeGregorio 
1996; DeGregorio and Snider 1995; Fox and Hammond, 1977; Hammond 1996; Malbin 
1980; Montgomery and Nyhan 2017; Patterson 1970; Price 1971). Importantly, this 
transference of legislative responsibilities to policy staffers by the member does not 
decrease his or her reputation of ability. In fact, it can enhance it. “That the individual 
member may not always personally perform each and every function does not diminish 
the impact of the work, or the member’s ultimate responsibility for what is done in his 
                                             
 
these are those that hold the tile of Legislative Assistant, though often Legislative Directors, Legislative 
Correspondents, and even Chiefs of Staff are assigned policy responsibilities. See Table A.3.1 within the 
Appendix for a breakdown of the titles most commonly responsible for policy management. 
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or her name” (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b, 565). DeGregorio and Snider (1995) and 
DeGregorio (1996) find that experienced staffers put in charge of the most controversial 
issues of the 100th Congress had an undeniable impact on the leadership reputation of 
the members they worked for. “In both articles the authors suggest that members who 
share work on major legislation with competent staffers enhance their own leadership 
recognition” (Hammond 1996).  
In this pursuit, members make tactical efforts to “professionalize” their staffs 
“thereby increasing the efficiency of their explicit analytical activities and enhancing 
their own knowledge and power” (Polsby 1969, 70-71). Put another way, staffers have 
indeed been found to effectively manage the most politically delicate and complicated 
issue areas for, and somewhat independently of, their members. But additionally, when 
they are successful, these policy staffers directly cultivate a more favorable opinion of 
their bosses’ ability to lead on such tough issues. The more effective the staffers are at 
their jobs, the higher the likelihood the member is thought to be at hers. 
3.2 Two different kinds of expertise 
I suggest that while the literature consistently finds that certain legislative staffers 
influence their bosses’ participation, information levels, even voting decisions, scholars 
to date have made little effort to detail what characteristics members value in assigning 
various legislative issue areas to their hired policy staffers. I attempt to do so, both 
theoretically and empirically, in this chapter. This study departs from past analyses of 
congressional staffing in that it leverages legislative portfolios and two different types of  
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staffer expertise in an attempt to quantify how members assign legislative duties to 
their policy aides. As CEOs of their office, legislators ultimately decide which staffers are 
responsible for which individual policy areas (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b). I disagree 
with the notion that little thought is given to which staffers warrant the House’s most 
prestigious and policy-heavy legislative responsibilities. Instead, I argue that members 
strategically assign more complicated, intricate, and important responsibilities to 
staffers most capable to handle them. 
 In other words, I attempt to quantify Hall’s (1998) observation that “The capacity 
and experience of the staff is crucial to a member’s ability to acquire, assimilate, and 
deploy the issue-specific information needed to participate on particular bills” (93). The 
next sections outline the potential motivations for members of Congress in assigning 
certain legislative portfolios to their policy aides, as well as provides empirical tests of 
whether members value certain kinds of experience from their legislative staffers in 
hopes of generating a more effective policy operation within their offices. 
3.2.1 Tenures and office counts 
Overwhelmingly, the staffing literature hypothesizes that members attempt to hire—
and are best served—by policy aides with a policy-specific expertise. The hiring of the 
most capable of policy staffers benefits the lawmaker in at least two ways. First, the 
member is better able to pursue his or her legislative outputs (McCrain 2018b). Effective 
policy aides are able to track, initiate, and mobilize policy solutions at opportune 
moments to satisfy the policy demands of the member and interested stakeholders 
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(Kingdon 1981). Second, the reputation of the member can be enhanced by the 
employment of such aides (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b). The office and the lawmaker, 
then, become known for in-house issue area expertise in house, thus becoming a source 
of information—a true comparative advantage in the legislative context (Curry 2015)—
to other offices in search of background and counsel, often under serious time 
constraints. 
Relying almost singularly on observational and qualitative analyses, scholars find 
that members are more willing to bestow judgment and authority in their name to 
staffers with more in-depth knowledge of a given issue (DeGregorio 1996; DeGregorio 
and Snider 1995; Hammond 1988). As a point of fact, scholars have found that aides 
with longer tenures are more likely to be granted increased autonomy, even decision-
making authority, to act on behalf of their boss (Romzek 2000). The story is rather 
simple: Aides with more experience handling an issue are more valuable to members 
where that issue is a legislative priority.   
In the legislative context, issue expertise doesn’t necessarily come from an 
educational or vocational background on the topic, but rather from years of experience 
within Hill offices dealing with legislative proposals. For this reason, many observers 
argue that a reliable proxy for issue expertise is the number of years spent on the Hill 
(e.g. DeGregorio 1996; DeGregorio and Snider 1995). As observed by Hammond (1996), 
“The autonomy of staff issue leaders is linked to their seniority” (547). In its crudest 
characterization, tenure equals experience, and experience equals expertise. In their 
years on the Hill, staffers acquire knowledge of the legislative history of their 
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responsibility, including insight on previous successful and unsuccessful attempts at 
policy change (Malbin 1980; Romzek and Utter 1997). They become familiar with 
obstacles to passage, the types of legislative language necessary for support, and whose 
backing is most influential and necessary for advancement. As written by Romzek and 
Utter, experienced staffers are viewed by members to “represent a thread of continuity, 
institutional memory, and expertise within the institution” (1997, 1252). 
Because many of the legislative responsibilities assigned to policy staffers are 
intricate and complex, members rightfully will value those with a proven track record of 
doing so and will purposefully attempt to assign more complicated, prestigious 
responsibilities to staffers with greater legislative experience. Put differently, because 
“personal professional aides are hired for ideas, judgment and counsel” (Fox and 
Hammond 1977, 25), staffers with histories of handling policy duties are assumed to 
have developed these qualities and, thus, generally are more valuable to members’ 
legislative interests. This is as far as scholars have progressed in determining how 
members ultimately staff their legislative portfolios: Staffers with more years of 
experience are assumed to have developed more policy expertise and, thus, are more 
likely to receive more complicated, policy-laden, prestigious legislative responsibilities.  
Though unquantified to date in studies of congressional staffing, this explanation of how 
responsibilities are assigned is assuredly the case. It only makes sense that longer 
serving aides gain trust from their employer that is reflected in their legislative 
portfolios.  
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But, I argue it is not the whole story. In fact, proxying expertise with number of 
years on the Hill, particularly in regards to policy-making, is problematic for a variety of 
reasons. For one, congressional year counts ignore any previous educational or private-
sector occupational experience where aides develop deep interest and knowledge in 
specific policy areas, such as earning advanced degrees in education policy or a previous 
career as an accountant. In many instances, aides can register as brand new to Capitol 
Hill with zero years of experience—a context in which the literature would cast them as 
novices in terms of policy expertise—when in actuality they may be bringing a wealth of 
experience with them on day one. For another, Hill tenures fail to take into account any 
service within special interest organizations or executive branch agencies where 
developing political relationships are essential to success. An aide with a thick rolodex of 
established political connections is well positioned to handle a legislative portfolio on 
behalf of his or her member-boss even with no previous Hill experience on their resume. 
Thus, I argue members also seek and value a second form of expertise in their 
most valued policy aides: the ability to build coalitions. I posit that members recognize 
that the policy effectiveness they seek is benefited from hiring Hill operators more 
plugged into social networks within and outside of the institution. In addition to issue-
specific technical expertise, policy aides must be able to initiate and develop coalitions 
for passage, synthesize information networks from a variety of offices and sources, and 
maintain strong and far-reaching relationships to effectively impact policy and serve her 
boss. The ‘unelected issue leaders’ described within the staffing literature are those 
with considerable impact on defining legislative language to interested parties, fostering 
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communication networks, and facilitating bargaining and negotiation sessions between 
members (DeGregorio 1996; Hammond 1988; 1996). In short, the most effective policy 
aides and those who are likely to be most valued by members and receive the most 
sought after legislative assignments, are the staffers most networked on the Hill and 
with interest groups.21  
The demands of a legislative assistant position are such that policy proficiency 
and Hill experience are simply not enough by themselves, especially for the most 
important policy issues. That is, a multitude of years in a single office is not sufficient. 
While it is clearly advantageous to a member to employ a legislative aide who knows the 
minutia of a particular subject—that is, owns an unquestioned policy expertise—more 
than technical knowledge is needed to effectively manage a legislative portfolio.  
Consider the duties and responsibilities for a policy aide in a House office, for 
example. The Congressional Management Foundation (2016) includes the following 
items in its job description for Legislative Assistants:      
     
● Formulates legislative initiatives for assigned issue areas which include: 
–  devising a legislative plan;      
 –  drafting the plan into legislative form;    
 –  planning, coordinating and scheduling introduction of legislation in the 
House (or offering it on an appropriate vehicle if it is in an amendment) 
 –  gathering support for a bill or amendment from other Members, as well 
as appropriate interest groups;      
 –  working with committees on legislation;      
                                             
 
21 McCrain (2018b) finds that the best-connected staffers ultimately become more valuable in terms of 
revenue generated for their lobbying firms after leaving Congress. I posit a similar argument in that a 
staffer’s increased connectedness is  valuable to members while they are in Congress. 
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 –  coordinating legislative support to get the bill passed in the House.  
● Tracks legislation and other developments in his or her assigned issue areas and 
briefs the Member for floor work, committee work, work in the district, and 
outside House-related activities; 
● Monitors legislative developments within committees; 
● Plans and coordinates co-sponsorship and support of other legislation; 
● Monitors legislation on the House floor, providing the Member with information 
on each vote; 
● Writes Floor speeches for the Member; 
● If assigned to issues pending before a specific committee, prepares for and 
attends committee meetings and hearings with or without the Member (i.e., 
keeps in contact with committee staff and meets with interest groups and 
constituents with interests in such meetings); 
● Acts as a liaison with committee and agency staffs;  
● Meets with constituents and interest groups;     
  
 
Many of these responsibilities for policy aides itemized, especially those 
italicized in the job description above, demand high levels of coordination with many 
players on and off the Hill. Simply put, legislative success requires large coalitions, both 
within and outside the chamber. Staffers with wider networks of other professional 
legislative staffers, interest groups, private sector policy advocates, and committee 
aides are likely far more able to facilitate the necessary coalitions that policy 
advancement requires. The time constraints on members means that drafting legislative 
language acceptable to other members, lining up cosponsors across offices, and aligning 
interest group support are largely executed at the staff level (Malbin 1980). 
Collaborative relationships are essential.  
 Maintaining far-reaching networks becomes even more vital for policy staffers, 
given that House policy aides are assigned more than eight individual legislative 
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responsibilities on average.22 Such a large number of issue areas puts incredible time 
constraints on policy aides and creates a context where staffers who are able to 
synthesize information and cultivate support from a variety of sources by being plugged 
in with other Hill operators are better able to serve their member’s policy goals more 
effectively (Whiteman 1995). Staffers with more extended networks to other staffers, 
member offices, and outside organizations face lower costs to assembling coalitions, 
and are consequently more valuable to their member bosses. Thus, members will value 
staffers they know to have broader networks, and reward the most connected aides 
with the most complicated, prestigious legislative portfolios because they recognize that 
their increased coordination capabilities lead to more effective policy management in 
the member’s name.23     
I suggest that wider networks are achieved by having operated in a greater 
number of different legislative offices on the Hill. Experience in multiple member offices 
allows staffers to enhance their skill sets on a variety of important responsibilities, from 
bill drafting best practices to soliciting cosponsors that other members respect and take 
                                             
 
22 This average is calculated from the author’s staffer database referenced within the following section. 
23 It is important to note that members do not try to advance policy on all, or even many issues. Whether 
because of district demands or needs, personal policy interests, or committee assignments, members are 
typically focused on a few areas of where they attempt to carve out a legislative reputation. Members 
cannot be, and are not expected to be, experts on all legislative issues. However, every Representative 
“engages in public policy formation” (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981, 565) and at a minimum, is responsible 
for maintaining some level of attention to policy issues across the chamber. Additionally, many issues 
have a direct constituent service component, such as Social Security requests from constituents looking 
for claim assistance from their elected Representative. Thus, lawmakers recognize that in order to best 
serve their reelection and constituent service interests, they must commit some level of staff attention to 
the legislative happenings across many issue areas to remain adequately responsive. In either case, I 
argue that members will greatly value more networked staffers to handle their policy portfolios. 
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cues from. Moreover, experience working for other members in different offices, even if 
in different roles, is a clear signal that an aide has developed a working network of 
contacts and is well versed in the institutional processes necessary to advancing the 
legislative portfolios to which they are assigned. Policy staffers with career histories in 
more member offices are, by definition, Hill operators, more plugged into the do’s and 
don’ts of legislative processes, and better able to effectively manage the legislative 
portfolios assigned to them by their member. Additionally, networked staffers are more 
keyed in to the political and partisan dynamics of other offices and the chamber, as well 
as more likely to enjoy essential connections with leadership and executive branch 
agencies. These relationships allow for better informed perspectives as to what policies 
are being discussed and developed, as well as keener insights as to how various policy 
proposals are likely to be received by other offices and relevant agencies. 
Importantly, members and their senior leadership staffers are in tune to the 
staffers they have seen competently advance an issue agenda for other members. 
Members know, or can readily find, staffers who are known to be issue operators and 
advancers on the Hill. As observed by Romzek and Utter (1997), “The work culture of 
Congress is fairly intimate; it is a relatively small-scale work setting where individuals are 
able to develop networks, working relationships, and opinions about staff and members 
based on first-hand experience” (1257). Staffers who develop such networks are those 
whose reputations warrant different legislative responsibility assignments when 
compared to staffers of the same title but of narrower legislative networks. 
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3.3 Legislative responsibilities and measures of expertise 
3.3.1 Prestige, policy, and constituent service legislative responsibilities  
Of course, not all issue areas are created equal. The literature has long detailed that 
certain congressional committees attract different types of members (Fenno 1973). 
Similarly for policy aides, to handle Budget matters requires a much different set of 
procedural and governmental knowhow than to cover Postal Issues, for example, and 
we should expect members to have different aides with different experience levels 
handle the two issues.  
The key thrust of my argument is that members will value the two types of 
expertise—often independently of each other—on issues that members themselves 
prioritize (Bullock 1976; Deering and Smith 1997; Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974). They will 
assign their most capable staffers the complex and most intricate issues knowing their 
expertise is needed and will best serve the lawmaker. Their longer tenures and wider 
networks allow for the generation of better crafted policies and stronger connections 
with stakeholders and relevant committees. For issue areas with a constituent service 
rather than policy bent, however, members will care less about assigning their most 
seasoned aides to their coverage. In fact, for constituent service issues members will 
likely value staffers who have worked only in their office, and thus have fewer unique 
offices in which they have worked, because they will maintain a stronger connection to 
that lawmaker’s personal district. Far less is to be gained by having wider networks for 
constituent service issues when compared to prestigious or policy legislative 
responsibilities. Moreover, when an aide gains increased Hill experience and office 
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counts, members will see them as too experienced for constituent legislative issues and 
will likely try to capitalize on their expertise on more important, complicated matters. 
To test the independent effects of the two types of expertise outlined above—
number of years on the Hill and number of different member offices worked in—on 
being assigned certain legislative issues, I constructed a dataset of all personal staffers 
employed by members of the House of Representatives for the 114th Congress using 
the Congressional Yellow Book staff directories.24 For each listed staffer employed in all 
House personal offices, the directory itemizes the specific legislative responsibilities of 
those assigned a legislative portfolio within each office. In all, the database contains 
records on nearly 6,700 congressional staffers, of which 2,018 are assigned at least one 
legislative responsibility by their member. Staffers with at least one assigned issue area 
are operationalized as policy aides within this analysis.  
 Incredibly, there are 1,242 unique legislative issue ares assigned to policy aides 
in the House and within the dataset. Nearly half (594) of the issue areas are assigned to 
one aide each (i.e., one staffer within the entire House is assigned one of the 594 
issues), and the maximum number of issue areas assigned to a single aide is 35. The 
legislative responsibilities used within this analysis are those in which at least one-third 
of all House offices assign at least one staffer, a clear signal that the issue is important to 
such a large number of legislative enterprises so that a member is likely to assign it to a 
staffer with sufficient expertise. Thirty-four legislative responsibilities meet this criteria.  
                                             
 
24 During the time of collecting staffers by office, former Speaker John Boehner’s (R-OH) seat was vacated 
by his resignation. Thus, there were no staff members associated with vacated district’s office. 
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 After narrowing down to these most commonly assigned legislative 
responsibilities to 34, I extended the Deering and Smith (1997, 80)25 classification 
scheme of prestigious, policy, and constituent service issue areas. In their work, the 
authors use the legislative jurisdictions of each congressional committee and expressed 
member views on the various committees to classify committees into groups. I extend 
the classification schema from congressional committees to individual issues largely 
based on the described legislative jurisdictions of specific policy areas, as well as which 
congressional committee is responsible for the legislative responsibility, matching as 
closely as possible to the groupings provided by Deering and Smith (1997). Prestigious 
committee assignments and issue areas are those with budget and agenda-setting 
responsibilities. Because “these committees impact every member of the House” they 
grant members a certain degree of authority or comparative influence over their 
colleagues (63). Policy issues are those that deal largely with salient national political 
issues—such as energy or taxes—and are regularly characterized as “important” and 
“complex” (72). Finally, constituent service committees and issues are seen as 
“extensions of their districts” in that their jurisdictions allow members a strong 
connection to their constituents, such as in providing any legislative assistance to Social 
Security or Medicaid claims (75). By distinguishing the types of legislative responsibilities 
                                             
 
25 Deering and Smith (1997) extended the schema generated by interviews of freshman members of the 
92nd Congress as towards their committee preferences. Fenno (1973) constructed similar interviews in 
classifying member motivations for joining particular congressional committees.  
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in this manner, I am able to directly test how levels of expertise affect the likelihood 
that a policy aide is assigned a particular issue area.  
Of course, not all issue areas provide a clean classification. Many, if not most, 
policy areas have both a policy focus and a constituent service component. Welfare 
issues are a prime example. Clearly there are legislative demands to covering this issue 
area as assistance programs are extremely technical and often part of proposed policy 
changes. But there is clearly a huge constituent service demand on the issue as well, and 
members rely on policy aides to explain program details, eligibility requirements, and 
changes to constituents directly and to district staffers responsible for assisting claims. 
For these tough to delineate issue areas it is imperative to remember that the 
classification scheme is based on members’ own views of the particular topics. It is how 
they have vocalized how they perceive the issues and the committees that handle them, 
and how they explain their motivations of whether to seek a committee or not. For 
example, for issues such as Medicaid and Medicare, of which there are certainly strong 
policy demands, only a small number of lawmakers take a policy interest in the topics, 
primarily members on Ways and Means and those who hope to be. But every member 
represents constituents who will need assistance on Medicare or Medicare issues. Thus, 
lawmakers view these issues as requiring more of a constituent service responsibility 
rather than offering opportunities for public policy changes. The legislative responsibility 
groupings for the issue areas in which at least one third of House offices assign a policy 




Table 3.1. Classification of common House legislative responsibilities 
Prestige Issues Constituent Service Issues 
Appropriations Agriculture 
Budget Animals 
Policy Issues Armed Services 
Commerce Defense 
Education Homeland Security 
Energy Housing 
Environment Immigration 
Financial Services LGBTQ Issues 
Foreign Affairs Medicaid 
Healthcare Medicare 
Intelligence Natural Resources 
Judiciary Postal Issues 
Labor Social Security 
Science/Technology Telecommunications 
Small Business Veterans' Affairs 
Taxes Welfare 
Trade Women's Issues 
Transportation/Infrastructure  
 
3.3.2 Hill tenures and office counts 
In order to create the two measures of expertise—Hill tenures and office counts—for 
each policy staffer employed in House personal offices, I collected the following from 
the same Congressional Yellow Book staff directory: the staffers’ names, titles, start 
dates, member employer, and career histories of those that had held previous titles 
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with their current Representative or within other Hill offices, including dates of service 
for each position. Using these dates and unique offices, I was able to create tenure 
lengths of service on the Hill as well as counts of the number of distinct legislative 
offices worked in for each policy staffer. 
Table 3.2 displays the average tenures in years—Hill Tenure—and the average 
number of offices in which staffers have worked—Office Count—across the various 
legislative responsibilities assigned to House policy staffers, as well as the number of 
legislative staffers within the chamber assigned to that particular issue.  
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Agriculture 418 6.93 1.68 Judiciary Issues 380 6.88 1.78 
Animals 206 5.44 1.37 Labor 375 7.26 1.76 
Appropriations 316 9.93 2.22 LGTBQ Issues 179 7.22 1.67 
Armed Services 164 6.58 1.67 Medicaid 314 7.86 1.82 
Budget 377 8.48 2.07 Medicare 322 7.91 1.8 
Commerce 162 8.06 1.98 Natural Resources 218 7.11 1.8 
Defense 376 7.52 1.80 Postal Issues 348 5.81 1.45 
Education 429 6.27 1.58 
Science/Technolog
y 331 6.46 1.63 
Energy 438 7.72 1.89 
Small Business 
Issues 302 6.82 1.74 
Environment 438 7.34 1.77 Social Security 353 7.3 1.64 
Financial Services 277 7.26 1.85 Taxes 381 8.22 1.99 
Foreign Affairs 389 7.22 1.84 
Telecommunicatio
ns 378 7.1 1.75 
Healthcare 447 7.66 1.82 Trade 363 8.05 1.92 
Homeland Security 380 6.79 1.76 
Transportation/ 
Infrastructure 415 7.84 1.9 
Housing 330 6.51 1.73 Veterans' Affairs 434 6.61 1.65 
Immigration 394 7.05 1.72 Welfare 348 6.3 1.55 
Intelligence 150 7.13 1.8 Women's Issues 173 6.99 1.7 
Average 333 6.82 1.77 Average 333 6.82 1.77 
  
Of the 34 issue areas used in this analysis, the fewest number of policy aides 
explicitly assigned the responsibility is Intelligence with 150 staffers assigned the issue. 
There are 447 different legislative staffers assigned to handle Healthcare issues, 
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highlighting the importance of committing staffing resources to at least monitoring 
health-related bills and matters for nearly all legislative offices. Five issues, ranging from 
Agriculture to Veterans’ Affairs, have over 400 staffers assigned to their coverage. The 
average tenure of aides assigned the listed issue areas is 6.82 years and the average 
number of different offices worked in is 1.77.  
Figure 3.1. Hill tenures and office counts of various legislative responsibilities 
 
 
Figure 3.1 plots the two forms of experience sorted by the number of years of 
experience, with Hill tenures on the left y-axis and office counts on the right y-axis. The 
issue areas are grouped by the classification scheme described previously. The figure 
shows the noticeable variation across issues areas and groups, with staffers assigned 
Appropriations issues maintaining the highest number of years on the Hill (9.93) and the 
highest number of different offices worked in (2.22). Staffers covering Animal issues 
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maintain the shortest Hill tenures (5.44 years) and lowest office counts (1.37). In terms 
of groupings, staffers assigned either of the two prestige issues have both significantly 
higher average hill tenures (10.05 years) and office counts (2.22) when compared to 
aides assigned policy issues (7.04 years; 1.74 offices) or constituent service issue areas 
(6.86 years; 1.70 offices). Clearly, differences in staffer expertise, in both forms, exist 
across issue groupings. But, which form matters more in the eyes of members in their 
decision to assign individual issue responsibilities? 
3.4 Modeling types of expertise on individual issue assignments 
In order to test the isolated effects of the two types of expertise on whether or not a 
policy aide is assigned a particular issue area26, I estimated a series of logistic 
regressions, one for each of the 34 common legislative responsibilities. The primary 
independent variables of interest are the two forms of expertise: number of years on 
the Hill—Hill Tenure—and the number of different legislative offices in which a staffer 
has worked—Office Count. Each model includes a control variable for the tenure length 
of each member of Congress to account for the likelihood that longer serving lawmakers 
may employ longer serving aides. All regressions include all standard errors clustered at 
the member level. Full regression results can be found in Table A.3.3 in the Appendix. 
 To interpret these models, I rely on the average marginal effects of Hill Tenure 
and Office Count. Here, a one-year increase in Hill Tenure and a one office increase in 
                                             
 
26 The dependent variable is whether an individual staffer is assigned the legislative issue area, coded 1 if 
yes, 0 if not. 
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Office Count imply an average increase in the probability that a policy aide is assigned a 
particular legislative responsibility, respectively.27 For ease of comparison across 
legislative issues, average marginal effects are grouped using the issue area 
classification scheme outlined previously and plotted with 95 percent confidence 
intervals to visualize uncertainty. Confidence intervals that do not cross zero can be 
interpreted as statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
Figure 3.2. Marginal effects of Hill tenure and office count on Prestige Issues 
 
                                             
 
27 All average marginal effects are estimated in Stata. It should be noted that average marginal effects 
differ from marginal effects at the means. In the latter, the mean value of each independent variable is 
used to generate marginal effects given the logistic coefficients from a model. Average marginal effects, 
by contrast, rely on the observed data to generate marginal effects for each individual observation, the 
mean of which is the average marginal effect.  
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Figure 3.2 plots the average marginal effects for the two prestige issue areas—
appropriations and budget—that were assigned to policy aides in at least one third of 
House offices. For both issue areas a one unit increase in each of the two types of 
expertise were statistically significant at the 0.05 level while holding all independent 
variables at their observed values. An increase in one-year of tenure for policy aides 
results in a 1.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood a staffer is assigned 
appropriations, while an increase of one office count results in a 3.5 percentage point 
increase. For budget issues, one more year on the Hill translates into a 0.7 percentage 
point increase and one more office worked in gains an additional 4.2 percentage points 
increase in the probability of an aide being assigned the issue area.  
Of course, because the two measures of expertise exist on two different scales—
years versus office counts—we should expect marginal effects for office counts to be 
higher than for Hill tenures; that is, one unit increases in office counts should register as 
a more pronounced increase when compared to a one unit increase in Hill tenure 
because staffers serve a greater number of years than the count of offices in which 
they’ve worked. Thus, a substantively direct comparison of the marginal effects for each 
type of expertise requires dividing the marginal effect of office count by the marginal 
effect of Hill tenure. Doing so equates the number of years served required to equal a 
one unit increase in the number of offices worked in. Therefore, for an aide being 
assigned budget issues, the staffer would need to work six additional years on the Hill to 
equal the marginal effect gained from working in one additional office. Because the 
mean tenure for budget aides is 8.48 years (see Table 3.2), the marginal effect in gaining 
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one additional office suggests that members potentially value wider networks relative 
to additional Hill experience for the issue. For appropriations, 2.69 more years of Hill 
tenure equal one additional office, a smaller yet significant increase in the likelihood of 
being assigned the issue. Generally, as theorized for prestige issues, members value 
both longer tenures and wider networks when deciding which staffers merit such 
prestigious assignments, but higher office counts prove to provide an additional form of 
expertise in handling such important issues for their member-bosses. 
Moving on to policy legislative responsibilities, and as depicted in Figure 3.3, we 
begin to see differences in the marginal effects of the two measures of expertise for the 
15 policy issues within the sample. These results provide strong support for the 
hypotheses that the two types of background confer different expertise, and that while 
members can value them simultaneously on a single issue, they often value one over 
the other on many. Increases in hill tenures are positive for seven of the policy issue 
areas, but only three of the issues reach statistical significance at the 0.05 level. For 
office counts, however, the marginal effects are much more pronounced. One unit 
increases in office count increase the probability of being assigned the issue in thirteen 
of the 15 issue areas, eight of which reach statistical significance (p<0.05). Longer Hill 
tenures were associated with lower probabilities of being assigned an issue for seven 
policy issues, and higher office counts only two issue areas with neither reaching 
statistical significance. 
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Figure 3.3. Marginal effects of Hill tenure and office count on Policy Issues 
 
The largest marginal effects for policy issues is found on taxes: a gain of one 
office produces a 3.8 percentage point increase in probability of being assigned the 
issue and a one-year increase in Hill tenure results in a 0.4 percentage increase. Thus, to 
be assigned taxes an aide would need to work an additional 9.5 years on the Hill to 
equal the marginal effect gained from working in one additional office. Commerce, 
energy, trade, and transportation issues all have similar marginal effect ratios when 
both measures of expertise are positive, highlighting numerous instances when Office 
Count appears to be the more valued form of expertise. 
Five policy legislative responsibilities produce positive marginal effects in Office 
Count and negative marginal effects in Hill Tenure. For judiciary issues, for example one 
additional office produces a 3.1 percentage point increase in being assigned the issue 
while a one-year increase in Hill tenure results in a 0.6 percentage point decrease. Both 
measures are statistically significant (p<0.05) but in opposite directions. Substantively, 
this suggests that members view increased Hill tenure as a potential waste of 
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experience and expertise on certain issues and instead see more networked staffers as 
better fits to handle the legislative responsibility. 
 Interestingly, education issues, thought to be an intricate policy area where 
wonks with deep histories on the subject are vital, registers negative marginal effects on 
both forms of expertise. One potential explanation is that the complicated legislative 
matters are handled outside of House personal offices and within the Education and 
Workforce committee and its staff devoted to the topic. Science/technology has a 
similar relationship though both expertise measures are imperfectly estimated. 
 
Figure 3.4. Marginal effects of Hill tenure and office count on Constituent Service Issues 
 
Finally, Figure 3.4 plots the average marginal effects for constituent service 
issues and shows strong support for the hypothesis that members care far less about 
either form of expertise on such issues. Of the 17 constituent service issues only five 
produce positive marginal effects for Hill Tenure with three reaching statistical 
significance; increased tenure on the Hill results in lower probabilities of being assigned 
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the responsibility on 12 issues, five of which are significant. Eight issues produce positive 
marginal effects for Office Count though only Homeland Security and housing are 
significant. Such findings can possibly be explained by the fact that both issues require 
constant contact with their respective federal agencies (Departments of Homeland 
Security and Housing and Urban Development, respectively) and increased office counts 
result in wider networks that facilitate information sharing and agency contacts.  
Three constituent service areas (animals, postal, and welfare) see negative 
marginal effects on both measures indicating that more expertise in any form leaves 
aides less likely to be assigned these issues. Generally, these results confirm the 
expectation that constituent service issues are viewed as entry level issue assignments 
given to newer policy aides and those with more limited networks. As policy staffers 
gain expertise in both tenures and network building they graduate from such district-
focused issues and are more likely to gain more prestigious and policy-laden issue 
assignments. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Legislative aides are often identified as vital, even influential, resources to members in 
assisting them with their policy duties as Representatives. The staffing literature, and 
much of the increasing writings on congressional capacity, have long assumed that the 
most effective aides responsible for important and difficult legislative portfolios are 
those with the Hill experience to warrant their assignment. Though empirically 
unquantified to date, the assumption has been that their higher levels of experience 
result in a deeper understanding of the particular issue area and the often insular and 
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convoluted ways of Congress. Using a novel dataset levering issue portfolios and career 
histories of all legislative staffers in the House I find this assumption to generally be 
true—longer tenured aides typically receive the most coveted issue assignments in the 
House. Yet, I argue that the inference in the assumption that tenure always confers 
expertise is incomplete. 
 Within this chapter, I theorize that members also value and seek policy aides 
that have a different form of expertise that better situates them to advance the policy 
interests of their member-bosses: wider networks due to their having worked in a 
greater number of different legislative offices. Recognizing that the effective coverage of 
many issue areas demands collaboration from many congressional, governmental, and 
private sector players, members seek and employ staffers who have proven to be 
capable aides within other legislative offices. It is these networked staffers, and not 
necessarily those with longer tenures on Capitol Hill, who members strategically assign 
their most important legislative portfolios.  
Using a modeling strategy that isolates the effects from both types of 
expertise—tenures and office counts—I find that members value policy aides who are 
most capable in cultivating relationships that lessen the burdens of information 
gathering and policy advancement for many of the chamber’s most prestigious, 
technical, and policy-heavy legislative responsibilities. For more constituent service 
responsibilities, such as postal and livestock issues, members require far less of either 
form of expertise. Instead, these issues are assigned to policy aides who have 
comparatively short Hill tenures and have worked for fewer different members. In 
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addition to better understanding the intra-office policy environment from the member 
perspective, these findings contribute to our understanding of which staffers—and 
which characteristics members seek—ultimately become those in which the 
congressional staffing literature have previously labeled as ‘unelected issue leaders’ 
(Hammond 1996) and ‘Unelected Representatives’ (Malbin 1980). 
While this chapter better defines and quantifies the levels of expertise that 
members seek when assigning coverage of issue areas in their name, it does little to link 
staffers to affecting measures of office productivity. In other words, if staff are as 
essential as I and others argue they are to lawmaker’s executing the responsibilities of 
their office, it should follow that when members lose their hired aides to turnover, the 
legislative enterprise should be less productive and successful because of their 
departures. As the next chapter will show, that is exactly the case.  
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Chapter Four: Departure Fallout—Congressional Staffer Turnover 




For many, the turnover of members of Congress is cause for concern. The impending 
exodus of lawmakers, no matter their reasoning, has caused many journalists and 
congressional observers to warn of the coming loss of institutional memory on account 
of departing members, particularly during an era of heightened partisanship and 
decreased legislative capacity (Lee 2009). These accounts reason that lawmakers who 
have become knowledgeable in the ways of the Hill are soon to be replaced by less-
experienced members that have no such know-how, ultimately culminating in a ‘brain 
drain’ on the chamber and the institution.28  
Receiving far less consideration are the consequences of the comparatively high 
rates of turnover of the thousands of behind-the-scenes staffers who members 
themselves acknowledge are responsible for much of the work done in their names (Leal 
and Hess 2004; Malbin 1980; Whiteman 1995). While increasing evidence has shown 
congressional aides are essential institutional resources to legislative productivity (Curry 
2015; Volden and Wiseman 2014), and staffers’ Hill legislative experience and 
                                             
 
28 Hawkings, David. “Inside the House Republican Brain Drain.” Roll Call, 11 Jan. 2018. 
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relationships are of considerable value to private sector lobbying firms (LaPira and 
Thomas 2014), surprisingly minimal scholarly attention, and no empirical study to date, 
has been devoted to detailing how losing congressional staffers in the form of turnover 
affects the legislative productivity and success of the Representative for which they 
work.  
This gap in political science scholarship is particularly surprising given the 
number of studies focused on pinpointing the factors that affect congressional and 
member productivity and effectiveness (Bernhard and Sulkin 2018; Binder 1999; Clinton 
and Lapinski 2006; Mayhew 2005), including the varying degrees to which lawmakers 
are successful in crafting legislative proposals and ushering them through the various 
stages of the legislative process (Volden and Wiseman 2014). These studies 
understandably concentrate heavily on member-level involvement in negotiating, 
crafting, and advancing policy. But, in doing so, they under-emphasize the role of 
congressional aides in carrying out these tasks while the lawmaker is busy with other 
duties of their job, and fail to consider how losing valued employees impacts the 
legislative outputs executed in their name. More specifically, no existing empirical work 
has focused on the degrees to which the departures of congressional aides affect 
members’ ability to successfully fulfill a primary requirement of their elected office: 
creating and passing public policies.29 
                                             
 
29 Montgomery and Nyhan (2017) show that members who hire aides from another lawmaker office are 
more similar in their voting behavior and legislative effectiveness. Though this study is predicated on 
staffers who turnover—that is, leave one office to join another—it is not focused on outlining the effects 
of turnover specifically, as done in this chapter.   
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This analysis looks to close these important gaps in our understanding of 
congressional behavior and effectiveness by drawing on the negative consequences of 
firm employee turnover consistently found within economics and organizational 
management literatures and applying them to the congressional context. In this chapter, 
I detail how and why members of Congress are far less successful in crafting and 
advancing policy when experiencing high levels of staffer turnover within their offices, 
and present the first empirical tests of the effects of staffer turnover on their legislative 
productivity and success as lawmakers. Using a unique dataset of congressional staffer 
employment and salary histories from the 107th through the 114th Congresses (2001-
2017), I estimate the effects of a staffer turnover within Representatives’ personal 
legislative offices. Employing member and Congress fixed effects, as well as other 
potentially confounding variables, two primary findings result: first, lawmakers with a 
higher proportion of staff salaries that depart the office experience less legislative 
activity than members with lower turnover; second, higher turnover members are 
generally less effective at advancing substantive bills through the legislative process.   
Just as congressional observers have predicted a 'brain drain' in the legislative 
branch as a result of members taking their experience and expertise with them as they 
depart Congress, I extend this logic and find tangible decreases in policy activity and 
effectiveness within a member's individual legislative enterprise when a higher 
proportion of office salaries turn over. These results suggest that the negative 
consequences of employee turnover found in economics literatures are found in the 
congressional context, with several important implications such as decreased 
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policymaking activity and success for members who experience the highest levels of 
staff turnover. 
More generally, these findings increase our understanding of policy-making in 
Congress, and reinforce the growing congressional capacity literature detailing that a 
Representative’s legislative activity and success is conditioned on the work of his or her 
more anonymous aides. Such findings contribute to a more complete view of 
Representatives’ role as managers of their own legislative enterprise, including the 
serious human resources considerations that go beyond more conventional aspects of 
their jobs as lawmakers.  
4.1 Linking Turnover to Congressional Offices 
Largely stemming from March and Simon’s (1958) theory of organizational equilibrium, 
economics literatures, particularly those devoted to management, human resources, 
and even employee psychology, have a rich history of studying the root causes and 
individual motivations of employees who choose to quit their jobs (Griffeth, Hom, and 
Gaertner 2000; Hom and Griffeth 1995; Maertz and Campion 1998). In the past twenty 
years, however, economists and organizational management researchers have shifted 
their focus from the individual to the aggregated broader impacts of employee turnover 
on work units, a concept known as collective turnover. 
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4.1.1 Collective Turnover and its Consequences 
Collective turnover is defined as “the aggregate levels of employee departures that 
occur within groups, work units, or organizations” (Hausknecht and Trevor 2010, 353).30 
At its core, collective turnover leaves behind the individual-level motivations and career 
choices of employees and employers, and instead focuses on the consequences of an 
organization’s aggregated turnover at the firm-level (Morgeson and Hofmann 1999). By 
aggregating to the organizational-level, collective turnover analyses allow more intuitive 
comparison across firms of similar structure (Johns 2006) and easier transitions into 
studies of organization performance and productivity (Batt 2002; Huselid 1995) . 
 Of course, some level of turnover is unavoidable and can even increase firm 
processes and outputs with the infusing of new people and ideas. Empirical analyses, 
however, have regularly found that higher rates of collective turnover often negatively 
affect organizations because employee turnover is consistently linked to a decrease in 
social capital and experience within the enterprise (Bluedorn 1982; Dess and Shaw 
2001; Mobley 1982; Price 1977), and increasing production burdens felt by the 
employees remaining in the office (Staw 1980). Disruptions within a work unit’s lines of 
communication and production processes are also commonly found with increases in 
collective turnover (Mueller and Price 1989; Staw 1980), as are increased costs 
associated with the hiring and training of replacement employees (Osterman 1987).  
                                             
 
30 Within the literature, collective turnover is also referred to as ‘team turnover’ and ‘organizational 
turnover.’ 
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In addition to impairing office processes and threatening internal dynamics, 
higher rates of collective turnover are also commonly associated with production 
decreases across a variety of firm outputs and performance measures. Higher rates of 
organizational turnover have found to decrease firm profits (Morrow and McElroy 2007; 
Peterson and Luthans 2006), lead to slower revenue growth (Batt 2002), less efficient 
manufacturing (Shaw, Gupta, and Delery 2005), and a decrease in firm sales (Shaw, 
Gupta, and Delery 2005; Siebert and Zubanov 2009). High collective turnover has also 
been shown to hurt more than a organization’s bottom line, as more turnover is linked 
to inferior customer service (Hausknecht, Trevor, and Howard 2009) and longer 
customer wait times (Kacmar, Andrews, Van Rooy, Steilberg, et al. 2006). I suggest high 
turnover legislative enterprises will see similar declines in productivity and 
effectiveness.  
Importantly, collective turnover and its consequences are not dependent on 
whether or not employee departures are voluntary or involuntary. Even with employees 
who leave involuntarily—that is, they were let go ostensibly because the position was 
no longer necessary or management would be able to find more capable and efficient 
replacements—their departures have been found to negatively impact performance 
largely because of the loss of specialized experience and replacement training demands 
on remaining employees (Hausknecht and Trevor 2010). No matter the impetus for 
employee departures, the effects of their loss are felt by the remaining work unit, often 
with measurable negative consequences. 
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4.2 Collective Staff Turnover and Legislative Productivity 
Following the findings of the negative impacts of collective turnover within offices found 
in the economics subfield literatures, this study focuses on the consequences of 
collective congressional staffer turnover in the 435 individual legislative firms within the 
House of Representatives. This chapter adopts this legislator-as-CEO framework 
(Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b) in its effort to quantify the effects of staffer turnover on 
the legislative success of each Representative’s legislative enterprise. The primary 
contention of this chapter is that offices that experience higher rates of collective 
turnover within a member’s office—that is a higher proportion of salaries that depart—
will have tangible negative consequences for the legislative activity and effectiveness 
executed in the member’s name. This is likely true for three primary reasons: office-
wide loss of staffer experience and capacity; disruptions of office division of labor; and 
dispirited work environments affecting collective staff motivations. 
 First, departing staffers, no matter their motivations for leaving, take with them 
their earned levels of experience, process knowledge, and expertise in their given job 
responsibilities. As a result of their departures, the aggregated capabilities of the 
legislative work unit are depleted due to the loss of those skills and abilities (Nyberg and 
Ployhart 2013). This reduction of unit-wide capacity by departing aides is particularly 
relevant in the legislative context because of its integrated, fast-paced, and convoluted 
processes that are best learned by active practice. Staffers experienced in the ways of 
the Hill, legislative histories, common obstacles, pivotal players, and who have well-
developed networks reduce the barriers to legislative success in Congress. When the 
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legislative enterprise loses what was previously an internal resource, the remaining unit 
has to find and develop supplemental information sources in order to maintain previous 
levels of productivity.  
Thus, the enterprise, particularly in the periods immediately following the 
departures of individual staffers, is faced with few good options to make up for the loss 
of office capacity. Remaining aides can look externally, within other legislative offices, 
support agencies, or special interest groups, for ancillary guidance or expertise (LaPira 
and Thomas 2014, 2017), take the time to rebuild the loss of capacity internally through 
training, or neglect the duties that were previously the responsibility of the departed 
staffer(s). In each instance, this loss of attention and expertise logically leads to less 
efficient, experienced, robust policy development and advancement processes in the 
member’s name. 
 The second reason staffer turnover results in decreased legislative productivity is 
a result of disruptions to internal office divisions of labor and workflow. Legislative 
success is inherently a collective effort that occurs over sometimes lengthy periods of 
time and requires multiple levels of aide attention and effort at various stages (Malbin 
1980). After all, policy creation involves detailed research, relationships and discussions 
with affected stakeholders, effective communications strategies, and often even a 
specific voiced constituent need. Staffer turnover, particularly within the policy and 
senior staffer levels, creates productivity shortages that demand attention be pulled 
from elsewhere. Quickly reworking previously understood divisions of labor typically 
results in less efficient production, as the duties of the departing staffer are likely to be 
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carried out by an aide less experienced and less familiar with the intricacies of the issue 
area, if attention is able to be supplied at all. As a result, the aggregate costs of 
production on the office-unit increase, as do the likelihoods of mistakes, delays, and 
tasks being overlooked (Nishii and Mayer 2009; Ton and Huckman 2008). 
 Turnover also affects office divisions of labor for the simple fact that attention 
must be devoted to interviewing, hiring, and training their replacements, often by those 
in the office, member included, with the longest list of responsibilities, harshest time 
constraints, and deepest involvement in policy development. Time devoted to hiring 
and training replacement staffers detract attention from responsibilities devoted to 
production levels, particularly for positions with policy responsibilities. As put by 
Hausknecht (2017), “[in] highly complex environments that require greater 
coordination, communication, and interdependence, turnover would be more damaging 
to unit performance because of the disruptions to unit function” (531). 
 The third reason higher levels of turnover likely lessens policy productivity in 
legislative enterprises is the deleterious effects of high turnover on the remaining 
collective work environment. Legislative enterprises are small work units in which 
success, failures, and stresses are felt by all under its employ, a condition that has been 
shown to exacerbate the effects of collective turnover, including lessened productivity 
(Nyberg and Ployhart 2013). What’s more, congressional staffers notoriously operate in 
extremely demanding, high stress environments, replete with comparatively low 
compensation, long hours, and relatively little opportunity for advancement 
(Congressional Management Foundation 2017; Romzek and Utter 1997). These staffer 
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frustrations are heightened under conditions of increased office turnover as employees 
are subsequently asked to increase their work responsibilities, often across positions in 
which they are less familiar with no increase in compensation, until replacements are 
hired and up to speed. In these instances, morale and employee motivation often 
declines, with depressed collective production and success as a direct result. 
Though turnover rates are commonly linked to negative firm consequences, it is 
important to distinguish between expected, healthy even, levels of employee turnover 
and extraordinary levels of staff departures where the negative implications are more 
likely to manifest themselves. Several studies have shown that collective turnover can 
often stimulate an organization’s productivity and increase efficiency in operations 
(Abelson and Baysinger 1984; Staw 1980). Inefficient or unhappy employees being 
replaced by more experienced or ambitious aides can logically increase firm production. 
Additionally, economics scholars have shown that turnover effects can be non-linear in 
that at certain levels and collective turnover can result in net-positive outcomes 
(Abelson and Baysinger 1984; Shaw, Gupta, and Delery 2005). 
Vitally, however, gains resulting from employee turnover do not last when 
turnover rates continue to increase to extraordinary levels. While some members are 
likely to be able to sustain production levels when a moderate percentage of staff 
salaries turn over, doing so gets increasingly difficult at severe levels where more, and 
more valued, aides depart. Thus, the most dramatic and negative effects of collective 
turnover can be expected at the most extreme levels, or in instances far above and 
below median levels. This expectation is directly applicable within the congressional 
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context given the steadiness of staffer turnover over time and the concentration of 
observations surrounding the mean level. It is at these more extreme levels where 
remaining aides are forced to cover for their departed colleagues, often on topics in 
which they have limited experience, and where more office-level attention is spent on 
finding and training replacements. Moreover, these effects at higher levels of turnover 
will be more pronounced on tasks where established experience, expertise, and 
relationships are most valuable: ushering substantive policy through the various stages 
of the legislative process. 
I formalize the application of the effects of collective turnover in the legislative 
enterprise context by the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Members who experience higher staff turnover within their personal offices 
willexperience lower levels of legislative activity. 
 
Although legislative activity of any kind undoubtedly requires significant staff attention, 
successfully advancing the most substantive of those proposals assuredly demands 
prolonged and more effective staffer involvement throughout the legislative process. 
Whereas more ceremonial and less significant proposals typically require less aide 
attention, time, and expertise for success, more substantive measures demand greater 
staffer savvy and expertise to anticipate and overcome inevitable obstacles to their 
advancement. For the same theoretical reasons cited above, increased levels of 
collective turnover within an office will negatively affect a lawmaker’s success at 
advancing substantive and significant policy proposals through the legislative process 
and into law. This expectation is formalized as: 
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H2: Members who experience higher staff turnover within their personal offices 
will produce less substantive legislation and be less successful advancing 
these bills through the legislative process. 
 
 
4.3 Data and Methods 
The proposed theoretical framework and empirical expectation suggest that higher 
levels of collective staffer turnover within individual Representative’s personal offices 
should depress the level of legislative success within the legislative enterprise, 
particularly when collective turnover is at the highest levels. This section describes the 
data and empirical strategy for testing these hypotheses. 
 
4.3.1 Congressional Staff Turnover 
 
Data on congressional staff employment histories, including compensation records used 
in this paper, are drawn from Legistorm, a non-partisan company that cleans, verifies, 
and maintains information about members of Congress and congressional staff.31 In 
order to create the congressional staff employment and salary data tables used within 
this analysis, Legistorm makes use of the publicly available Statement of Disbursements 
(SOD) compiled by the House’s Chief Administrative Officer.32 The SOD is a collection of 
all itemized payments submitted quarterly by each congressional office, personal and 
committee, to the Clerk of the House. Each payment includes: all payment amounts 
                                             
 
31 Available at, https://www.legistorm.com/index/about.html 
32 Available at, https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/open-government/statement-of-disbursements 
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made to individual staffers; the staffer’s title; the office in which the payment 
originated; and the dates associated with each payment.  
Using the publicly available SODs, Legistorm verifies the employment dates of 
each individual staffer and standardizes inconsistencies found within the submitted 
compensation records, such as different spellings of a staffer’s first name or use of a 
middle initial. Using these records, I create a working history of the dates and offices in 
which each staffer has worked based on which offices have submitted payments to each 
aide and the dates of payment. For this study, I collapse these standardized staffer-level 
records to the member-Congress level. Specifically, I create counts of the total number 
of aides an individual lawmaker employs in each Congress, the number of those aides 
that departed during that same period, and crucially for this analysis, the amount in 
salary that departed the office versus total salaries paid to staff within each Congress.33  
 
4.3.2 Use of Salary Weighted Turnover 
 
Following recommendations within the empirical economic collective turnover 
literature (Nyberg and Ployhart 2013; Siebert and Zubanov 2009), this study constructs a 
weighted turnover measure rather than a simple ratio of the number of departed aides 
to the number of total number of employed staffers in a given time period. The 
weighted measure employed in this analysis uses the proportion of total salaries paid to 
departing staffers to the total salaries paid within each individual office for each 
                                             
 
33 Temporary employees and interns, though receiving reported compensation, were excluded from the 
data and subsequent analysis due to the structurally transitory nature of their employment. 
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Congress from the 107th through the 114th (2001-2017). This proportion is shown 
below: 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 




The weighted measure is used for several reasons. First, effects of employee 
turnover are most likely to manifest in instances in which (1) a large proportion of 
employees depart, and (2) fewer high valued, longer-serving aides turnover. The former 
scenario results in a loss of coverage across various office responsibilities and detracts 
leadership attention towards their replacement; the latter a loss of institutional memory 
and experience. Effects stemming from both instances are effectively captured by using 
Salary Weighted Turnover. 
Second, and relatedly, though legislative offices are a collective enterprise, not 
all staffers affect the legislative activity and success levels at equal rates (Romzek and 
Utter 1997). Policy-specific staffers, and especially more senior staffers, such as 
legislative directors, are more effective at introducing and advancing legislation, and are 
compensated better than many positions without policy responsibilities, such as staff 
assistant and scheduler (Petersen 2012). Thus, using the salary weighted turnover 
proportion better estimates the effect of losing more valuable aides who are more likely 
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to be regularly involved in the policy process versus strict headcounts that equate lower 
value staffers to the most valuable.34 
Third, headcount turnover ratios have been found to miss important staffer-level 
characteristics, such as experience and value of the departing aide, that logically affect 
the output of the collective work  (Hausknecht and Holwerda 2012; Heavey, Holwerda, 
and Hausknecht 2013). Though value and experience levels are not immediately 
captured by salary received, compensation serves as a reasonable proxy for relative 
value within the office as longer-serving, more experienced staff members are likely to 
earn higher salaries. Finally, evidence suggests that simple aggregations of counts are 
not representative of effects in more collective environments (Morgeson and Hofmann 
1999), or in work units in which successes and failures are generally shared across the 
entire office climate (Nyberg and Ployhart 2013). Both of these features are true within 
legislative offices. The work demands within personal House offices are such that very 
few tasks are carried out without some level of involvement or assistance from fellow 
staffers within the enterprise. This mutual-dependence for task completion at the staff 
level, particularly in regards to crafting and advancing policy where research, legislative, 
and communications aides often play a role, effectively make each lawmaker’s office a 
                                             
 
34 Due to data limitations on staffer locations, Salary Weighted Turnover, however, does not explicitly 
distinguish between positions or rank within the office, the locations of where the staffers work (district 
or D.C. office), or the likelihood of affecting policy. This means the components of weighted turnover 
includes salaries paid to staffers working in district offices, many of whom, such as as District Director and 
District Chief of Staff, are among the best compensated positions of all House staffers (Petersen, Eckman, 
and Chausow 2016). On the positive side, it is not uncommon for senior district staffers to be responsible 
for district-focused policy issues such as agriculture and welfare. Thus, their turning over is likely to impact 
legislative productivity on these topics, though not at levels comparable to policy-focused D.C. policy 
aides. 
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relatively collaborative effort with shared stakes in outcomes. As such, a value-weighted 
measure of turnover is more appropriate to approximate effects of departing aides.35 
To match the time period of the dependent variables, the turnover calculations 
for each member-year were aggregated to the two-year Congress level where the 
average proportions of the two years was used. Importantly, in an effort to avoid 
overestimating a lawmaker’s weighted turnover and its effects, a member’s last year in 
office is eliminated from the sample. This is done for two reasons. First, facing a closing 
legislative enterprise, a vacating member’s aides are incentivized to secure employment 
outside of the departing lawmaker’s office, driving up turnover. Second, a departing 
member may become less invested in drafting, introducing and advancing legislative 
measures, ultimately lowering the levels of legislative productivity that are the main 
focus of this analyses. Dropping the last year of a lawmaker’s House career from the 
sample ensures the results are less influenced by either likelihood. 
                                             
 
35 Admittedly, this analysis, and the available data, do not integrate a standard temporal argument that 
staffing turnover directly leads to decreased legislative activity and effectiveness. For both the 
compensation records used to create salary weighted turnover and the counts of all legislative dependent 
variables, final dates ignore the often long and fluid processes involved in crafting and advancing policy 
and discerning impacts of staffing changes. As such, this analysis follows the recommended standards 
within the business management literature (see, (Hausknecht and Trevor 2010), particularly for highly 
dependent and collective work environments such as legislative offices. 
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Figure 4.1. Density plot of Salary Weighted Turnover 
 
 
Figure 4.1 plots the density curve of Salary Weighted Turnover. There is a clear 
concentration around the mean (0.205), indicating that an average Representative’s 
office is expected to have a fairly stable staffer attrition rate of about 20% of its paid 
office salaries in each Congress. Despite the concentration around the mean, the figure 
also shows that many offices experience a weighted turnover of at least 0.33 -- where 
one third of the salaries paid out in a given Congress were paid to staffers who vacated 
that office during the time period. The maximum weighted turnover in the sample is 
0.83. Figure 4.2 plots Salary Weighted Turnover for each party for every Congress in the 
sample. Though the distributions of each Congress vary, Figure 2 shows that salary 
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weighted turnover is remarkably stable over time and across parties, with means 
ranging from a low of 0.184 (111th Congress) to a high of 0.223 (113th Congress).  
Figure 4.2. Salary Weighted Turnover by party, 107th - 114th Congresses 
 
4.3.3 Measures of Legislative Activity and Effectiveness  
In this analysis, legislative activity for Hypothesis 1 is proxied by four dependent 
variables for each Representative in every Congress from the 107th through 114th: 
number of Bills Sponsored, number of Amendments Sponsored, number of Bills 
Cosponsored, and number of bills for which the lawmaker was the Original Cosponsor. 
Though each of these measures is a type of legislative activity in which lawmakers take 
part, they do differ in their difficulty in execution as well as the level of staffer attention 
required for their production. Bill sponsorships, for example, require a member’s office 
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to research, author, and introduce a particular piece of legislation, whereas bill 
cosponsorships only require the member to add his or her name as second-order 
supporters to an already authored bill. The former generally demands more staff 
attention and expertise for success, while scholars have classified the cost in generating 
high numbers of the latter as comparatively minimal (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996). 
Amendments sponsored are also authored by an individual’s office, though are generally 
more limited in their length and scope than sponsored bills. Finally, original cosponsors 
demand slightly more office involvement researching the details of the legislation than 
other bill cosponsorships because the office is the first one committing their name in 
support of the measure rather than following the lead of other offices that have already 
done so. Counts of each of these variables were obtained for every member of each 
Congress in the sample from Congress.gov.   
 The legislative effectiveness measures used for testing Hypothesis 2 are key 
components of Volden and Wiseman’s (2014) member Legislative Effectiveness Scores 
(LES). More specifically, this study uses Volden and Wiseman’s counts for each 
lawmaker per Congress of the number of substantive bills at each of the five major 
stages of the legislative process: 1. introduced; 2. received action in committee; 3. 
passed out of committee and received floor action; 4. passed the House; and 5. became 
law. As theorized by the authors “not all bills are of equal importance, and thus might 
not be equally indicative of a member’s overall lawmaking effectiveness” (20). Because 
of its greater impact and scope, substantive legislation requires more lawmaker and 
staffer effort, skill, and attention. By using only substantive legislation for this analysis 
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rather than including ceremonial or commemorative legislation, I am better able to 
ascertain the degrees to which weighted salary turnover impacts advancing more 
substantive legislation through the various stages of the political process on the types of 
policies in which staff involvement is likely to be most required. 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the legislative activity and effectiveness 
variables used in the analyses. Table A.4.1 within the Appendix provides histograms of 
each of the dependent variables. 




Deviation. Min Max 
Bills Sponsored 17.79 12.62 0 128 
Amends. Sponsored 2.42 4.42 0 72 
Bills Cosponsored 300.83 153.65 0 1238 
Orig. Cosponsor 103.96 61.73 0 484 
Substantive Bills Sponsored 13.5 10.33 0 119 
Substantive Bills - Action in 
Committee 1.48 2.29 0 25 
Substantive Bills - Action 
Beyond Committee 1.43 2.29 0 25 
Substantive Bills - Passed 1.06 1.72 0 17 
Substantive Bills - Law 0.34 0.84 0 12 
 
4.3.4 Control Variables 
A number of covariates are incorporated in the analysis to better isolate the effect of 
salary weighted turnover on legislative activity and success within an individual 
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lawmaker’s office. First, dummy variables are included for members who serve in the 
majority party, and as committee chairs committee ranking members. These controls 
are included because the lawmakers in the listed positions maintain heightened 
influence in deciding legislative agendas and committee actions, as well as their 
increased access to staff resources (Berry and Fowler 2016; Krehbiel 2010).36 Second, 
the length of tenure of the member is included to account for more senior lawmakers 
potentially being more effective at producing policy due to their increased experience 
and more established networks on and off Capitol Hill. Third, a dummy variable is 
included for members who serve in more vulnerable districts, which likely impacts 
staffer and member attention paid to electoral politics versus legislation productivity. A 
lawmaker is designated to serve in a vulnerable seat if the Cook Political Report 
competitiveness rating37 classified the district as either a ‘toss up’ or ‘leans 
Democratic/Republican’ district for each election cycle. Conversely, members serving in 
‘likely democratic/republican’ and ‘safe’ districts received a zero. Table 4.2 presents 




                                             
 
36 Originally, the models included a control variable for lawmakers in leadership positions given the 
likelihood that their legislative success is benefited by their institutional and staffing advantages. However, 
given the extremely few numbers of shifts of members holding these positions, the models had trouble 
estimating the effects.  
37 Available at https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings.  
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics of variables, 107th - 114th Congresses 
N=3,441 Mean Std. Deviation. Min Max 
Salary Weighted Turnover 0.205 0.114 0 0.83 
Majority 0.547 0.498 0 1 
Member Tenure 12.3 8.37 1 44 
Committee Chair 0.048 0.214 0 1 
Comm. Ranking. Mem. 0.048 0.212 0 1 
Vulnerable Seat 0.262 0.44 0 1 
 
4.3.5 Modeling Strategy 
Given the count nature of the dependent variables for both hypotheses, this analysis 
tests a series of negative binomial regression models (Long 1997).38 Each hypothesis 
tests the effects of salary weighted turnover on the dependent variables of interest with 
Congress and member fixed effects. Critically, lawmaker fixed-effects effectively control 
for members who are, for any number of reasons, less competent as legislators. Such 
members would likely experience both higher levels of staff turnover and lower levels of 
legislative activity. The within-member models used in this analysis help account for this 
possibility.39 Moreover, the inclusion of lawmaker fixed-effects rules out many member-
                                             
 
38 Though other models are also equipped to handle count dependent variables like the poisson, the 
negative binomial is preferable in the presence of overdispersion. In my case, overdispersion would be 
present if the conditional variance of each dependent variable is greater than the conditional mean. 
Overdispersion was confirmed by using the regression-based tests recommended by Cameron and Trivedi 
(1990).  
39 While member-specific effects are important, and potentially even provide a more interesting 
journalistic account of staff turnover, the main goal of this analysis is to isolate the effect of aide turnover 
on common measures of legislative productivity. Put another way, non-random variation in Member 
characteristics (such as poor management, no previous experience, etc.) is also likely to influence 
legislative productivity, but the use of fixed effects controls for these within-member characteristics to 
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specific attributes—previous local or state political experience or occupational history in 
a given sector, for example—that do not vary throughout the sample period and could 
potentially affect an individual lawmaker’s legislative acumen and potential for 
legislative activity and success. The Congress fixed-effects used in each model 
specification remove the effects of Congress-specific shocks or differences. Each model 
also includes the previously discussed control variables in order to account for factors 
that may confound the effect of weighted collective turnover on legislative productivity 
and success.  
4.4 Results 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that members who experience higher levels of salary weighted 
turnover will be less effective in ushering substantive legislation through the legislative 
process. Table 4.3 presents the negative binomial regression estimates for four 
dependent variables of legislative activity: number of Bills Sponsored, number of 
Amendments Sponsored, number of Bills Cosponsored, and number of bills in which the 
lawmaker was the Original Cosponsor. As indicated by the negative coefficient on Salary 
Weighted Turnover, as the proportion of salaries of departed staffer-salaries to total 
office salaries paid increases, each indicator of legislative activity variables decreases. 
Two of the four variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level and a third, Original 
                                             
 
better capture the effects of staff turnover on the array of productivity measures. This study does attempt to 
explain what member characteristics affects outputs but rather focuses on the effects of turnover itself. 
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Cosponsored, is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Only Amendments Sponsored 
fails to reach statistical significance, but does follow the same negative relationship. 
Turning to control variables, a few findings are of interest. First, members of the 
majority party sponsor more bills but fewer amendments and cosponsor fewer 
measures with higher rates of salary weighted turnover. Second, Committee Chair is 
expectedly positively related to the number of bills and amendments sponsored, but 
negatively to bill cosponsorships and original cosponsorships. This indicates that 
committee chairs focus their legislative clout and attention more on bill authoring rather 
than supportive outputs such as cosponsoring. Additionally, though lawmakers 
occupying a Vulnerable Seat are less legislatively active across all measures, only bill 
sponsorships reaches statistical significance indicating that vulnerable members sponsor 
a fewer number of fewer bills than their more electorally secure colleagues.  
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Table 4.3. Effect of Salary Weighted Turnover on legislative activity, 107th-114th Congresses 
 Dependent variable: 
 Bills Sponsored Amends. Sponsored Bills Cosponsors Orig. Cosponsor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Salary Weighted Turnover -0.20** -0.3 -0.13** -0.11* 
 (.09) (.15) (.06) (.06) 
Majority 0.23*** -0.16*** -0.07*** -0.11*** 
 (.02) (.05) (.01) (.01) 
Committee Chair 0.36*** 0.28*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
 (.04) (.10) (.03) (.03) 
Committee Ranking Mem. 0.10*** -0.02 -0.03 -0.011 
 (.05) (.11) (.03) (.03) 
Member Tenure -0.005 -0.01 -0.006 0.01 
 (.001) (.007) (.05) (.004) 
Vulnerable Seat -0.02** -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 
 (.02) (.06) (.01) (.02) 
108th Congress -0.02 0.24*** -0.003 -0.004 
 (.03) (.08) (.02) (.02) 
109th Congress 0.15*** 0.58*** 0.07*** 0.007*** 
 (.03) (.08) (.02) (.02) 
110th Congress 0.32*** 0.52*** 0.30*** 0.17*** 
 (.03) (.08) (.02) (.02) 
111th Congress 0.22*** -0.01 0.24*** 0.16*** 
 (.03) (.09) (.02) (.02) 
112th Congress 0.19*** 0.60*** -0.15*** -0.27*** 
 (.03) (.09) (.02) (.02) 
113th Congress 0.07** 0.26*** -0.10*** -0.21*** 
 (.04) (.09) (.02) (.02) 
114th Congress 0.25*** 0.57*** 0.02 0.05** 
 (.04) (.09) (.02) (.02) 
Constant 1.95*** 0.64*** 2.93*** 2.64*** 
 (.01) (.15) (.06) (.06) 
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Observations 3,258 3,089 3,258 3,258 
Log Likelihood -7,843.59 -3,774.28 -13,774.99 -11,415.92 
Note: Models included member fixed-effects. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Because it's difficult to interpret the substantive significance of negative 
binomial coefficients, I rely on predicted counts of the four legislative activity 
variables.40 Figure 4.3 plots the predicted number of each legislative activity at various 
levels of Salary Weighted Turnover. All variables are held at the observed values as 
suggested by Hanmer and Kalkan (2013). Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are 
plotted around the estimated curves. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, as Salary Weighted 
Turnover increases, the predicted counts decrease for all measures of legislative activity. 
In regards to bills sponsored, lawmakers with a mean salary weighted turnover of 0.21 
are predicted to sponsor 8.6 bills per Congress. As salary weighted turnover increases to 
0.5, the predicted count falls to 8 bills per Congress, and at a maximum salary weighted 
turnover of 0.83 the predicted count decreases to 7.5 per Congress, roughly a 8% 
decrease in bill sponsorships. Amendments sponsored experiences the largest percent 
decrease based on predicted counts with a 19% drop as salary weighted turnover 
increases from the mean level of salary weighted turnover to the maximum. 
                                             
 
40 All FE models were estimated using the negbin function in the R package pglm, which implements a 
conditional negative binomial model. The individual fixed effects in this specification are modeled through 
the negative binomial’s dispersion parameter and are therefore not factored in when generated 
predictions. Because of this, all predicted counts assume that the individual effect is zero, an assumption 
which makes the predictions scaled downward from the unconditional mean (Allison and Waterman 
2002). This results in the predicted counts appearing to be smaller when compared to the summary 
statistics provided in Table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.4 plots the marginal effects of discrete changes in Salary Weighted 
Turnover across each of the four variables of legislative activity. Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals are plotted around the estimated marginal effects and all intervals 
that do not cross the horizontal line at zero indicate a statistically significant estimate at 
the 0.05 level. Notably, and as previously theorized, the estimated marginal effects of 
increases in weighted turnover across each of the four measures grow more 
pronounced in the quartile increase from the 75th percentile to the 99th percentile 
where weighted turnover is likely having its most damaging effects on office 
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productivity, as compared to more common and expected levels of congressional 
turnover. 
 




Focusing on bill sponsorships, a one quartile increase in a Representative’s 
weighted turnover from the minimum to the 25th percentile is estimated to result in 
0.22 decrease in bills sponsored per Congress. A lawmaker with salary weighted 
turnover at the 75th percentile can expect an estimated decrease of 0.48 bills sponsored 
per Congress, and a discrete change to the maximum level of weighted turnover is 
estimated to decrease the number of bills sponsored per Congress by one bill. The 
marginal effects of quartile increases in weighted turnover across the other three 
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legislative activity variables are substantively similar. Figure 4 provides clear support to 
the expectation that the most dramatic effects of salary weighted turnover are found in 
the discrete changes from the 75th to the 99th percentiles where legislative offices have 
experienced extraordinary levels of staffer turnover. 
Turning to measures of legislative effectiveness and substantive legislation, 
Table 4.4 presents the negative binomial regression estimates for the five dependent 
variables of legislative effectiveness: number of Substantive Bills Sponsored, number of 
substantive bills receiving Action in Committee, number of substantive bills being 
receiving Action Beyond Committee, number of substantive bills Passing the House, and 




Table 4.4. Effect of salary weighted turnover on legislative effectiveness, 107th-114th 
Congresses 




Subs. Action in 
Comm. 
Sub. Action 
Beyond Comm. Sub. Bill Passed Sub. Bill Law  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Salary Weighted Turnover -0.14 -0.36* -0.46** -0.49** 0.19 
 (.10) (.22) (.21) (.24) (.07) 
Majority 0.22*** 1.10*** 1.12*** 1.04*** 1.11*** 
 (.02) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.11) 
Committee Chair 0.21*** 0.70*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 1.26*** 
 (.05) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.14) 
Committee Ranking Mem. 0.1 0.24** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.22 
 (.05) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.23) 
Member Tenure -0.008 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.02 
 (.006) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) 
Vulnerable Seat -0.08*** -0.04 -0.14** -0.11* 0.15 
 (.03) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.12) 
108th Congress -0.07 0.11 0.12 0.15* 0.25** 
 (.04) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.12) 
109th Congress 0.13*** 0.05 0.20*** 0.22** 0.14 
 (.04) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.13) 
110th Congress 0.29*** 0.55*** 0.69*** 0.83*** -0.07 
 (.04) (.08) (.08) (.09) (.15) 
111th Congress 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.45*** 0.56*** -0.2 
 (.04) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.16) 
112th Congress 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.19** -0.06 -0.1 
 (.04) (.08) (.09) (.10) (.16) 
113th Congress 0.13*** 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.30*** 0.03 
 (.04) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.16) 
114th Congress 0.31*** 0.54*** 0.66*** 0.59*** -0.08 
 (.04) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.17) 
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Constant 1.93*** 0.77*** 1.12*** 1.26*** 0.74 
 (.10) (.27) (.36) (.36) (.70) 
Observations 3,258 3,026 3,017 2,937 2,117 
Log Likelihood -7,265.38 -2,764.23 -2,652.24 -2,250.23 -1,068.50 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Models included member fixed-effects.  
 
As previously theorized, the impact of salary weighted turnover is most likely to 
be felt dealing with more substantive policies at more advanced stages of the policy 
process due to their likelihood in being handled by more experienced, expertised aides 
earning higher salaries. Table 4.4, and corresponding Figures 4.5 and 4.6 provide 
relatively strong support for this expectation. While a negative relationship does exist 
between salary weighted turnover and substantive bills sponsored, the relationship is 
not statistically significant. At later policy stages, however, action in committee, action 
beyond committee, and passed the House, the relationship reaches statistical 
significance. Interestingly, the relationship turns positive when a substantive bill is 
signed into law, suggesting that staff turnover matters less with legislation that 
ultimately passes both chambers. This supports previous findings that legislation, 
particularly of substantive importance, is increasingly written with limited involvement 
from rank-and-file members and their staffs (Curry 2015). 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 plot the predicted counts and discrete changes of the five 
legislative effectiveness variables across different levels of Salary Weighted Turnover. As 
predicted, as Salary Weighted Turnover increases, the predicted counts decrease for all 
measures of legislative effectiveness, save becoming law. In regards to substantive bills 
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sponsored, lawmakers with a mean salary weighted turnover of 0.21 are predicted to 
sponsor 8.2 substantive bills per Congress. As salary weighted turnover increases to 0.5, 
the predicted count falls to 7.75 bills per Congress, and at a maximum salary weighted 
turnover of 0.83 the predicted count decreases to 7.5 per Congress, a 5.5 percent 
decrease. Far more substantive drops are predicted when salary weighted turnover 
increases from the mean to maximum levels at subsequent steps within the legislative 
process. Predicted counts of substantive bills receiving action in committee fall 26 
percent, receiving action beyond committee 19 percent, and passing the House 
decreasing 26 percent as salary weighted turnover increases from the mean level to the 
maximum.  
 















 To make better sense of the substantive significance of these estimates, Table 
4.5 provides the mean values for legislative activity and effectiveness variable found 
within the sample, as well as the percent changes for moves to the 75th and 99th 
percentile of salary weighted turnover compared to those means. Increases in salary 
weighted turnover do result in decreased productivity across all measures of legislative 
productivity, with the biggest decrease occurring with amendments sponsored. 
However, as Table 4.5 makes clear, a much stronger substantive case can be made on 
measures of legislative effectiveness. Of particular substantive significance, an increase 
from the the median level of salary weighted turnover to the 3rd quartile predicts a 
decrease of 0.62 substantive bills with action in committee and a decrease of 1.17 
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substantive bills receiving action on the House floor after committee consideration. 
These moves represent decreases of 42 percent and 82 percent, respectively compared 
to mean levels of effectiveness on these measures. A similar jump from the mean to 3rd 
quartile of salary weighted turnover equates to a drop of 133 percent of substantive 
bills that pass the the chamber.   
















% Change - 
Mean to 
99%  
Bills Sponsored 17.79 17.31 -2.72% 16.81 -5.54%  
Amends. Sponsored 2.42 2.26 -6.75% 2.10 -13.34%  
Bills Cosponsored 300.83 300.23 -0.20% 299.58 -0.41%  
Orig. Cosponsor 103.96 103.53 -0.42% 103.06 -0.86%  
Substantive Bills 
Sponsored 13.5 13.20 -2.19% 12.90 -4.48%  
Substantive Bills - Action 
in Committee 1.48 0.86 -41.76% 0.26 -82.13%  
Substantive Bills - Action 
Beyond Committee 1.43 0.26 -81.91% -0.85 -159.44%  
Substantive Bills - Passed 1.06 -0.35 -133.26% -1.68 -258.11%  
Substantive Bills - Law 0.34 0.54 57.54% 0.83 145.38%  
 
These tangible impact effects can also be illustrated with a few real-life observed 
effects for individual legislator offices. Table 4.6 presents examples of how salary 
weighted turnover impacted key legislative activities of lawmakers within three different 
scenarios: low to high salary weighted turnover in successive congresses for both a 
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Republican and a Democratic Representative, and an instance in which salary weighted 
turnover transitioned from high to low back to high over several congresses. Vitally, no 
member listed in Table 6 experienced shifts in important confounding variables, such as 
gaining a committee chairship or changing from a safe to vulnerable seat, though Rep. 
Gallegy did transition from the majority to the minority for the 110th Congress. In each 
case, the member generally produced far less across each of the measures of legislative 
activity during congresses with high salary weighted turnover, and was comparingly far 
more active during congresses in which salary weighted turnover was low. 
Table 4.6. Case studies: Rep. Tim Huelskamp (R-KS), Baron Hill (D-IN), and Elton Gallegly (R-CA) 
 Bills Spons. 
Amends. 
Spons. Bill Cospons. Orig. Cospons. Sub. Bills 
Rep. Tim Huelskamp (R-KS)      
112th Congress - Low Turnover      
Salary Weighted Turnover = .12 32 4 236 74 32 
113th Congress - High Turnover      
Salary Weighted Turnover = .335 8 2 216 71 4 
      
Rep. Baron Hill (D-IN)      
110th Congress - Low Turnover      
Salary Weighted Turnover = .045 24 1 317 83 21 
111th Congress - High Turnover      
Salary Weighted Turnover = .215 14 3 226 65 13 
      
Rep. Elton Gallegly (R-CA)      
109th Congress - High Turnover      
Salary Weighted Turnover = .205 12 0 195 57 5 
110th Congress - Low Turnover      
Salary Weighted Turnover = .02 28 0 332 118 21 
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112th Congress - High Turnover      
Salary Weighted Turnover = .31 17 1 213 74 15 
4.5 Conclusion 
Too often the House of Representatives is characterized as a body consisting of 435 
voting members who are merely supported in their duties by legislative aides. More 
accurately, the chamber is made up of 435 fairly independent personal legislative 
enterprises, each one consisting of upwards of 22 employees, and a bevy of 
organizational, productivity, and human relations issues found in private firms.  
 This chapter has provided the first empirical test of the impact of congressional 
staffer turnover within lawmakers’ offices. The evidence presented shows that members 
who lose higher proportions of staffer salaries in a given Congress experience declines in 
legislative effectiveness across common variables of lawmaker policy activity and 
effectiveness, even after controlling for potential confounding factors such as holding a 
committee chairmanship and serving in an electorally secure seat. This research and its 
findings contribute to the growing literature on the importance and influence of 
congressional staff, and give strong evidence of members’ reliance on staffers for the 
execution of their legislative duties. 
This chapter produces two important implications. First, lawmakers experiencing 
high levels of staffer turnover are at a resource disadvantage in fulfilling the many and 
varied responsibilities of their elected office compared to their colleagues with more 
stable employment environments. As a result, lawmakers are likely less effective and 
efficient in serving their constituents, from policymaking to constituent service. Second, 
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high turnover offices are less able to steadily participate in, and ultimately influence, the 
policy process in Congress due to office attention being spent on maintaining minimal 
levels of production and replacing departing aides. Thus, low turnover lawmakers, and 
his or her aides, are in a comparatively favorable position to impact policy throughout 
the legislative process.  
Though an important first step, this analysis provides but only a preliminary look 
into the effects of turnover within legislative offices. Its strong findings of tangible 
negative consequences on productivity levels should prompt several fruitful avenues of 
research. Most notably, and following lines of research within the organizational 
management literature, future analyses should zero in on the positions and experience 
levels of staffers who drive the declines in legislative productivity and success. After all, 
in using a measure of collective turnover, this study did not distinguish between staffers 
with job titles and duties responsible for the development of policy. Theoretically, one 
would expect that legislative offices who experience higher rates of turnover within 
policy positions will experience more drastic declines in legislative productivity when 
compared to offices who face higher rates of turnover in communications and 
constituent service related positions. The same is likely for offices losing more 
experienced and tenured aides relative to staffers who have only served a short period 
in the office and in Congress. 
Additionally, future research should explore the variance in staffing choices in 
freshman members, as well as the conditions or contexts under which members choose 
to reallocate their staffing resources once in office. For example, do freshman members 
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with previous political experience see lower levels of aide turnover in their first terms 
because they are better prepared for the legislative work environment and hire 
accordingly? Future work should look to levels of staffer turnover as indicators of 
impending changes on behalf of the lawmaker, such as running for higher office or 
leaving the chamber altogether. Answering these questions can better explain 
congressional behavior, using staff, lawmakers’ primary institutional resources, as a key 
explanatory factor.  
Thus far this project has focused on member use and impacts of staffers within a 
member’s personal office. The following chapter turns to aides who serve congressional 
committees. It is these staffers who are thought to possess deeper levels of issue area 
expertise, both from their longer tenures on the Hill and because of their more 
committee-focused issue portfolios. Because of this more substantive knowledge of 
issues and Congress as an institution, committee aides are often characterized as true 
drivers of committee and congressional productivity. But as the next chapter makes 







Chapter Five: How Committee Staffers Clear the Runway for 
Legislative Action in Congress41 
 
 
"...so my chief counsel...he's a lawyer, and he'd been doing it for a long 
while, so he was an expert on that whole process. How do you choose 
the issues in your [inaudible 00:10:48] that you want to investigate how 
do you bring witnesses in and how do you interrogate, so to speak, 
before they testify? What documents do you gather, and all that sort of 
stuff....and he's the guy who would be sitting next to me through all 
those hearings whispering in my ear, passing me notes, and because he 
knew the political process, he knew the legislative process, and he 
[inaudible 00:11:34] spent a ton of time developing expertise and 
knowledge on each one of these issues, and we usually had several 
investigations going at once, so we have, I don't remember how many 
staff we had, but I probably had 5 or 6, 7 staff that were just helping me 
with an investigation."  
 
---- Former Member of Congress 
 
 
Much of the scholarship on policymaking and legislative productivity in Congress in 
recent years has focused primarily on partisanship (i.e., Lee 2009, 2016), the 
centralization of policy crafting in congressional leaders (Curry 2015), and their 
                                             
 
41 Note: An early version of this chapter was co-authored with Charles Hunt and presented to The State of 
Congressional Capacity Conference on March 1-2, 2018 in Washington, D.C. The earlier chapter has been 
submitted for peer review as part of an edited volume on congressional capacity. While there is some 
overlap with the earlier chapter, this chapter included in this dissertation includes significant 
improvements of the data, theory, and results, including new robustness checks. The text, however, still 
refers to both authors, such as in writing ‘we’ and to other chapters submitted for the edited volume. 
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multifaceted effects on who dictates the policymaking process and legislative outcomes. 
While not misplaced, this focus can shortchange some of the many important ways in 
which Congress can improve the quality and quantity of their legislative output, 
particularly within the committee process by which Congress is supposed to develop 
policy and push it through the chambers.  
Congressional committees and the legislative outcomes they produce remain 
relevant in a number of important ways. From a policymaking perspective, committees 
are known as the places where issue expertise resides and where most deliberation on 
policy alternatives occurs. This is most often researched from the perspective of 
lawmakers and the expertise, experience, and policy interests they possess. 
Membership on committees is often purposeful, where members are assigned based on 
educational, occupational, or geographic interest in a particular policy area, in part 
because this matching is likely to lead to legislative productivity (Francis and Bramlett 
2017). Committees delineate these jurisdictions in order to provide increased attention 
to specific issue areas. In doing so, the chambers achieve a division of labor that allows 
lawmaker specialization across the vast number of government issues, ultimately 
resulting in a more efficient use of member time and more reasoned, thoughtful policy. 
To further define the potential benefits of the division of labor provided by 
committee jurisdictions, we argue that the advantages committees provide by 
cultivating issue specialization and efficiency are every bit as relevant in the composition 
of committee staff. We show not only that committees produce more meaningful 
legislation when staffed at higher capacity, but perhaps more importantly, that 
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committees are demonstrably more productive when equipped with the right staff to 
execute the appropriate legislative function. We define the “right staff” as those whose 
job descriptions and expertise match the nature of the legislative function being 
performed. Even when controlling for specific committee, chairperson attributes, 
majority status in both chambers, and other political and committee-level variables, we 
find that committee legislative productivity is best facilitated by a robust staff 
presence—in particular, staff whose experience is best-suited to each of three distinct 
types of legislative output we measure in this work. 
This research closes a critical gap in our understanding of how committees 
operate. It extends to congressional staff the nuances of policy specialization we apply 
to lawmakers, and it shows that committees not only take these staffer-level 
characteristics into account, but that they are wise to do so due to the resulting boost in 
certain types of legislative productivity. Our results should induce congressional scholars 
to rethink how staffers can be used to increase capacity in the committee process, and 
how staffers with different substantive expertise and experience might be more 
effectively applied to specific types of legislative output to increase legislative 
productivity, efficiency, and quality. 
5.1 The Legislative Impact of Committee Staff 
 
Though they often remain nameless to the general public, and even to other legislative 
offices, much of the day-to-day work done on specific issue areas and policy proposals is 
executed by committee staffers. Thus, it is not surprising that congressional studies and 
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lawmakers themselves regularly contend that congressional staffers increase the 
capacity of lawmakers and the institution (Malbin 1980). Despite this acknowledged 
reliance on congressional aides, the staffer and increased capacity relationship is often 
overlooked, particularly in recent decades, in the very places most scholars assume 
staffer expertise to be at their highest levels and impact on legislative activity to be 
greatest: congressional committees. A primary contention of this project is that this 
member reliance, and staff impacts on committee productivity, is at least as marked at 
the committee level. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Legislative Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970 
substantially increased staffing capacity at the committee level in an effort to keep pace 
with an explosion of staffing and bureaucratic specialization within the executive 
branch, as well as to help lawmakers cope with their expanding workloads. In contrast 
to personal office staffers that have so far been the focus of this dissertation, committee 
aides are devoted full time to their committee’s specific jurisdictional and policy issue 
areas “to provide committees with substantive expertise relevant to the subject matter 
of each committee” (Deering and Smith 1997, 163). 
Unsurprisingly, scholars have found even increased member reliance on 
committee aides for policy helps largely due to their greater experience levels and 
longer congressional tenures (Aberbach 1987; Brady 1981; Deering and Smith 1997; 
DeGregorio 1988; Malbin 1980; Price 1972; Salisbury and Shepsle 1981a). However, just 
as there are differences in expertise and influence within personal offices, studies have 
found not all committee staffers automatically enjoy influential status. After observing 
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Senate committee activities and procedures, Price (1971, 1972) makes the distinction 
between ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and ‘policy professionals’— the former are in constant 
search of opportunities for the implementation of policy solutions, whereas the later are 
more willing to let committee members dictate where their policy attention should be 
spent. In either case, the committee staffer is viewed by lawmakers as a vital repository 
of long-serving institutional memory and issue area expertise who contributes vitally to 
committee production. Polsby (1969) writes that the specialization and issue area 
expertise of committee staffers allows for lawmakers to “increase the efficiency of their 
explicit analytical activities and enhanc[e] their own knowledge and power” (70-71).  
As ample evidence has shown, including within this dissertation, members rely 
on their personal staffers to create a more efficient, more productive operation of their 
personal office-enterprise. Dependence of committee members on committee staffers 
is likely even more pronounced for at least two reasons. First, and most importantly, 
committee activities are but one subset of a member’s responsibilities and attention. 
Put directly, lawmakers only spend a portion of their time and attention on matters 
within their assigned committees; for committee aides, on the other hand, committee 
matters make up their entire job description.  
Committee staffers largely serve at the discretion of the chair or ranking member 
depending on which party employs them, and are expected to consistently execute on 
the priorities of their respective party’s leaders and committee members even when 
members are not actively engaged in committee activities. These member priorities 
manifest in a variety of committee outputs that are largely developed, researched, and 
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advanced by full-time committee aides. In other words, common committee outputs—
policy creation, oversight activities, and committee hearings—all occur and require 
significant and regular staffer attention relatively independent of committee members. 
Once the direction and focus of the committee is set by its leaders and members, much 
of the work towards specific outputs is executed by its aides. Importantly, members 
often act on the work of committee aides only at the culmination of staff work, such as 
voting to report a bill out of committee that was largely researched, negotiated, and 
written by committee aides. 
The second reason member reliance is more pronounced at the committee level 
is committee staffers are viewed as distinct sources of issue expertise and institutional 
memory on the policy topics within each committee jurisdiction, and represent an 
invaluable resource for the committee to effectively operate. This is true for a variety of 
reasons. First, committee aides typically maintain longer congressional tenures than 
staffers employed in personal offices (see, Petersen, Eckman, and Chausow 2016). This 
longer service allows staffers to become well-versed in the ways of the Hill, develop 
contacts and relationships across offices and parties, and become fluent in the 
intricacies of legislative research, policy crafting, and political motivations that often 
propel or stifle legislative action.  
Second, committee staffers enjoy a more limited issue portfolio than personal 
aides. Whereas committee staffers are expected to become experts on the issues 
relevant to their committee’s jurisdiction, personal office staffers are more policy 
generalists whose portfolios are so broad that issue area expertise is much harder to 
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develop. More narrow policy focus allows for committee aides to be better-versed in 
the minutia of policy details, likely obstacles, and legislative histories that are vital to 
successful policy creation.42 Moreover, more tenured aides with concentrated portfolios 
allow for committee staffers to develop and maintain relationships with policy 
stakeholders and pivotal players within and outside the institution, identify policy 
windows for legislative entrepreneurship, as well as better anticipate likely 
consequences and costs associated with their legislative proposals.  
Third, because committee staffers are employed by the entire committee rather 
than a member facing reelection every two years, committee work is often 
accompanied with less attention devoted to issues of reelection such as constituent 
service responses or direct district messaging of individual members. As such, 
committees offer staffers an opportunity to execute on issues in more depth with less 
regard to the day-to-day political happenings of any individual member-boss or 
Congress as an institution. For staffers who have committed to a career in Congress, 
committees provide them a more concentrated issue portfolio and a more stable source 
of employment when compared to personal offices where turnover among staffers is 
higher and tenures are generally shorter. 
                                             
 
42 Within another chapter of the congressional capacity edited volume entitled, “What Do Congressional 
Staffers Actually Know.” Dr. Miler finds that staffers who engage in issues more regularly, such as 
committee aides who are responsible for consistent attention on issues within their committee’s 
jurisdiction, maintain higher levels of policy knowledge when compared to aides who never or only 
occasionally work on an issue.  
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It is already apparent that staff support is not only helpful, but necessary to 
legislative productivity for individual members of Congress, congressional committees, 
and for the institution as a whole. But, the above reasons lead us to expect that 
committee staff are just as, and likely even more essential to the operations of 
committees and serving the needs of its elected members than the literature regularly 
finds with personal staffers. At a time when concerns about congressional gridlock and 
productivity are paramount, increased staffer support should increase the ability of a 
committee to function, produce, and execute on its specific priorities. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the capacity of congressional committee staff, the 
greater the legislative output will be in committees. 
 
5.2 The “Right Staff” At The Right Time 
  
Though empirically untested, the importance and impact of committee staff is not 
novel. As put by Deering and Smith (1997), “Committee staff influence the agenda-
setting decisions of chairs, advocate or even champion legislative proposals, conduct 
investigations, negotiate on behalf of committees and their chairs, and work to build 
coalitions in committee, on the floor, and in conference. The assistance of quality staff 
can give a committee...a substantial advantage over competitors in legislative politics” 
(162). 
But, to date, congressional observers have largely overlooked which committee 
staffers influence various committee outputs, instead most often referring to committee 
aides as a singular resource with few distinctions between their duties and respective 
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influence on outcomes. The preceding quote aptly describes both the influence of 
committee staff and the varied aspects of their jobs, but it fails to recognize that each of 
the itemized tasks demands very different strengths, talents, and expertise on the part 
of committee staffers. For example, conducting a fruitful committee oversight 
investigation requires a vastly different set of skills than authoring legislative proposals, 
and negotiating the scope of a committee hearing utilizes different talents than building 
coalitions for ultimate passage on the floor. 
Though often grouped together, committee aides vary considerably in their job 
titles and responsibilities. Some are tasked with policy duties, such as researching and 
authoring legislative proposals for committee consideration; others are responsible for 
carrying out a communications strategy for the committee to present its work to 
interested parties; still others serve as leaders overseeing the staff and production, 
responsible for facilitating progress on committee priorities with outside actors. Along 
with these occupational differences, committee staffers are demonstrably diverse in 
their respective personal and occupational experience as well as their levels of 
legislative and procedural expertise. Some are oversight experts with long tenures at 
federal agencies and others serve with over a decade of congressional experience and a 
mastery in parliamentary procedure. Staffers are valuable in their respective roles, but 
they are valuable on different tasks and at different times. 
Therefore, a second primary contention of this chapter is that congressional 
committee outputs are affected by the particular type of staffers executing its work. We 
argue that the different types of staffers are better suited to influence production of 
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varying types of committee outputs, and at varying stages of the legislative process. 
These stages of the process—our three dependent variables for this study—require 
different levels of policy and political maneuvering and expertise which we argue 
different types of committee staffers are in positions to provide, and therefore have 
positive effects on that particular output. First, we use the number of substantively 
important bills that are reported out of committee; second, the number of hearings 
conducted by that committee; and third, the amount of committee-reported legislation 
that eventually passes the House chamber.  
 We focus on the two contingents of committee aides that are most likely to 
influence the legislative productivity of their respective committees: policy staffers and 
senior staffers. Policy aides are those most responsible for researching and improving 
various potential policy proposals, often that have been referred, and authoring 
legislation that satisfies the members of the committee, many of whom are policy 
entrepreneurs themselves on the committee’s issues. Often policy aides have a 
established expertise on matters within the committee’s jurisdiction thanks to extensive 
personal and vocational experience with the relevant issues. They are the most likely to 
be familiar with the intricate details and legislative histories of issues and have 
developed relationships with internal and external policy stakeholders.  
Such issue area expertise is of particular value to congressional committees in 
the early stages of policymaking as staffers work to implement the policy goals of their 
respective committee members into viable legislative proposals to be reported out for 
consideration. A great deal of substantively important legislation is considered within a 
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congressional committee, but such legislation is of varying quality. The likelihood of any 
one piece of legislation being reported out of committee depends in part on how well 
crafted the legislation is, and how it reflects the policy demands of at least a majority of 
committee members. Thus, the amount of policy expertise applied to that legislation is 
of great consequence. We argue that policy staffers are on the whole most likely to have 
influence at initial stages within the committee as policy proposals are being crafted and 
improved on, as opposed to in later stages of the process in which political and agenda 
setting considerations become more paramount (Kingdon 1984). With this in mind, we 
predict: 
  
Hypothesis 2: The greater the number of policy-oriented House committee staff, 




This initial stage of the legislative process in which legislation is crafted and 
reported out of committee depends on more than just the quality of the policy. Serious 
political considerations that depend on assessments of how likely a piece of legislation is 
to find broader support within the committee are also involved. Subsequently, this 
support within the committee is itself subject to a perception of how likely that 
legislation is to pass at the chamber level or become law. We argue that senior 
staffers—the vast majority of whom hold the titles of staff director or deputy staff 
director—are in a particularly strong position to anticipate and answer these political 
questions during the committee phase such that only the most politically viable 
legislation is reported out and is ultimately approved by the full House.  
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Moreover, the role of senior staffers also entails navigating the political and 
communications dynamics that accompany legislative decisions beyond the committee 
stage. Whereas policy staffers’ main priority is to craft legislation that satisfies the policy 
demands of committee members, senior staffers are more responsible for guiding the 
decided-upon legislation out of the committee; into the chamber as a whole where 
political dynamics are much more prevalent; and potentially into law, all in an effort to 
satisfy members’ individual policy and political motivations.  
To do so, senior staffers maintain strong networks with committee leaders, 
members, and personal staff, and as a result, are in a better position to align committee 
activities with the agendas set forth by party leaders for maximum effectiveness. This 
increased level of cooperation between committee staff, outside stakeholders, and 
committee and chamber leaders should therefore make senior staffers valuable for the 
successful advancement of committee legislation, from being reported out of 
committee to being passed by the full chamber. As such, we similarly predict: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the number of House committee senior staff, the 
greater the number of important bills reported out of House committees 
and passed by the chamber. 
 
In this study, we propose that committees’ ability and decision to take up and 
accomplish specific legislative goals is conditioned on whether they have the necessary 
staff capacity to accomplish them. A possible alternative explanation for the importance 
of staff reverses this causal effect. In this line of thinking, committees decide to pursue 
certain types of legislative activity, and then staff their committees based on these 
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specific goals. We believe this proposition is faulty on a theoretical level since 
appropriations for committees, and therefore funds available for staffing decisions, are 
set by Congress in advance of each year pursuant to House rules.43 Thus, within-year or 
within-Congress staffing adjustments would require supplemental appropriations. 
Though such instances have occurred, they are extremely rare. 
Nevertheless, one empirical approach to forestall this alternative explanation 
would be to lag the dependent staffing variables by one year; if our effects hold, then it 
is difficult to argue that the decision to act legislatively comes first rather than increases 
to staff capacity. However, in two of the years in our sample, party switches in control of 
the House precipitated large staff changes that cause us to drop observations. Relatedly, 
party switches took place in the Senate and the presidency at several points over this 
time period, further complicating any lagged effects. Finally, and most importantly, 
lagging these variables creates a mismatch in all years between election years and non-
election years: in effect, non-election year staffing is predicting election year outputs, 
and vice versa.44 Even so, lagging these variables preserves the directionality, though 
not the statistical significance, predicted by Hypothesis 1. Regression results using the 
lagged staff count dependent variable can be found in Tables A.5.3 and Tables A.5.4 
within the Appendix. 
                                             
 
43 House Rule X, clause 6. 
44 One way to address this final issue would be to lag staffing variables by two years, but this would not 
only exacerbate the previous two issues (party switches in other chambers and branches of government), 
but would represent a deeply unrealistic conception of how far in advance Congress plans their legislative 
agenda when political winds can change so fundamentally over the course of an entire election cycle. 
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A more explicit test of the alternative hypothesis just discussed is to lag staff 
variables in the opposite direction, effectively testing the causality of committee’s 
preemptively ‘staffing up.’ If we expected anticipated legislative action to drive staff 
hires in committees, we could confirm this by using a committee’s legislative action in a 
given year to predict the following year’s staffer counts as the dependent variable. 
However, models constructed to test this alternative hypothesis failed to converge, 
much less predict any kind of positive result. Each of these tests give us greater 
confidence in the causal direction of our argument. 
5.3 Data and Methods 
To test these expectations, we combine a number of preexisting datasets on committee 
activity and legislative outputs, as well as an original and comprehensive dataset on 
committee staffing capacity. These data span from 2001-2017, which allows us to 
capture the effects of staffing as it varies within-committee over time.45 It also provides 
a particularly tough but important test for the power of congressional capacity in an age 
where much of congressional activity is thought to be governed by partisanship (Lee 
2009) and/or party leaders (Curry 2015). If staff capacity can continue to have an effect 
                                             
 
45 While it is a critical policymaking committee, particularly in the House, we have removed the 
Appropriations Committee from our models for two reasons. First, due to the sheer scope of the 
appropriations process, each member of the committee is assigned a staffer who is responsible for 
tracking various legislative processes within the committee for the respective member. Such an 
arrangement is not true of any other House committees. Second, in part due to these supplemental 
staffer assignments, Appropriations is an outlier in the balance of staff types as well as the sheer size of 
total staff. The committee is three full standard deviations above the maximum in the sample of House 
committees that does not include them. For these reasons, Appropriations skews the results and 
descriptive statistics in such a way that we omit this committee from final results.  
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in even the most party-dominated environments for policymaking, it is a signal that 
staffers are not merely helpful, but truly essential in addressing and executing on 
committee priorities, including passing important legislation through regular procedures 
in Congress. 
Notably, we study the impact of staffing on committee outputs only within the 
House of Representatives. We do so for several reasons. First, because there are far 
fewer members of the Senate, individual committees are composed of a greater 
proportion of the chamber across the board, significantly diluting the leverage gained by 
serving on such a committee relative to other Senators who do not. Relatedly, the 
average Senator serves on more than double the number of congressional committees 
than the average House member and nearly triple the number of subcommittees 
(Ornstein, Mann, Malbin, Rugg, et al. 2013). As a result, Senators are in a far better 
position to execute on policy concerns no matter if it is a one of their top priorities. 
Third, Senate rules and procedure grant Senators more opportunities for individual 
members to affect policy changes independent of the committee process. Fourth, 
Senators enjoy much larger personal office staff sizes that are better able to execute on 
all aspects of their office, from policymaking to constituent service to communications 
efforts aimed at increasing the visibility and prestige of the Senator. For these reasons, 
in addition to Senators’ bigger and more diverse constituencies, our analysis is limited to 
committees within the House where we are more likely to find such marked distinctions 
in how members view committee assignments and responsibilities (Deering and Smith 
1997). 
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In order to assess the impact of congressional committee staffing capacity on 
committee activity, we employ three important measures of legislative outputs: 
substantively “important” bills voted out of committee, important bills passed by the 
chamber that were under the jurisdiction of that committee during its life cycle, and 
total number of hearings held by each committee.46  Vitally, this data categorizes bills as 
“important” bills of substance as opposed to ceremonial bills of little importance.47 
These bills are a better measure of the impact of committee staffers on committee 
productivity, as more substantive legislation typically demands increased committee 
aide experience, issue expertise, and staffer attention for advancement of these issues 
relative to ceremonial measures. We use by-year counts of these “important” bills that 
have been reported out of the committee in which they were referred, as well as counts 
of bills which after having been referred to this committee, passed the chamber in 
which they originated.48 Both of these measures are strong indicators of substantive 
legislative output from the committees, and also measure the committee’s influence in 
the chamber in which they reside. The third measure of output used in this project is an 
                                             
 
46 From Adler and Wilkinson’s (2006) “Congressional Bills Project, available at 
www.congressionalbills.org/.  
47 Congressional Bills Project describes their process for coding “important” vs. “not important” bills as 
“based on the presence of certain words in a title and can be used to exclude bills that are arguably of 
minor importance. For example, bills to name buildings are fairly common and a large proportion of the 
laws that are passed.” A full explanation of their coding methods is available on the “Codebooks” page of 
their website (see Footnote 5). 
48 Congressional Bills Project captures all bills that passed or did not pass the chamber, whether they 
were in fact reported out of committee or not. Therefore, the “number of important bills passed” variable 
captures both reported bills and non-reported bills that went to the floor. We also are not concerned 
about overdispersion of individual bills: More than 80% of all bills were only referred to one committee in 
one chamber, and greater than 95% were only referred to two - and most of these were the two 
appropriate committees from each chamber. 
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original dataset of aggregated counts of committee hearings held in all House 
committees.  
Committee staffing data used in this project is drawn from Legistorm’s personnel 
compensation database which dates back to 2001. Legistorm cleans and digitizes official 
staffer compensation information submitted by all congressional offices, personal and 
committee, to the Clerk of the House. These pay records itemize payments made to 
each individual staffer, the title held by the staffer, and the office in which the payment 
originated. The House reports these payments via a statement of disbursements every 
three months.  
Our data breaks down the number of staffers assigned to a committee in a given 
year, as well as the types of positions they hold. These staffer counts include any aide 
that received a payment from the committee within a given year, including paid interns, 
fellows, part-time, shared, and temporary employees. While Legistorm’s data is rich in 
detail and completely comprehensive in its reach, its pre-cleaning categorization of 
staffer position types was insufficient to address the relative impact of each type on 
committee productivity. The “pre-clean” bars in Figure 5.1 show that of the over 62,000 
staffer-years in our dataset, nearly 60% were either Uncoded (categorized in our data as 
“Other” staff members) or categorized as “Professional Staff Members” (PSMs), who are 
staffers with functions that vary widely between committees and therefore cannot be 
easily classified based on title.  
As a first step towards correcting this issue, we used regular expressions to 
search the job titles listed within the official compensation records provided by 
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Legistorm and re-classified many (in fact, a vast majority) of staffers previously classified 
as PSMs or uncoded. Many previously uncoded staffers had titles that made their 
purpose more apparent: for example, “Staff Assistants” and “Research Assistants” were 
previously uncategorized; using regular expressions, we reclassified these as 
Administrative and Policy Staffers respectively. PSMs were more difficult, but since 
staffers were classified by year, we were able to reclassify over 80% of these staffers 
based on previous titles they had. For example, we would classify a PSM whose title in a 
previous year “Policy Coordinator” as a Policy Staffer, since a wholesale change of 
expertise type is highly unlikely from year to year. With all of these changes, we were 
able to bring the total percentage of uncoded staffers (including PSMs)49 down from 
56% to just over 11% of all committee staffers over the 18-year period of our study. 
Figure 5.1 visualizes the results of this coding and data cleaning process, and a more 
complete description of the operationalization of these regular expression groupings by 
title can be found in Tables A.5.1 and A.5.2 located in the Appendix.  
 
                                             
 
49 Remaining proportions of Uncoded or Professional Staff (who for all intents and purposes are uncoded) 
were quite low across all committees. As Figure 5.1 indicates, the total Uncoded and PSM staffers amount 
to around 11% of all staffer-years post-clean, and all committee-years used in our models fell within a 
range of 7%-15%. This gives us confidence that these proportions aren’t deeply biasing our results for any 
one committee. 
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Figure 5.1. Committee staffer types as percentage of total, 2001-2017 
 
 
After this classification process, we then aggregated the counts of staffers into 
four distinct position categories for each committee year: policy, communications, 
administrative, and senior staff. PSMs and uncoded Staffers were not included in the 
committee-level analysis. The trends resulting from this process make clear what many 
congressional observers have suspected but not quantified regarding committee staffing 
allocations. Figure 5.2 shows the percentage change in total numbers of different staffer 
types across all House committees since 2001. One clear trend is that before 2006, 
increases and decreases of committee staffers tracked closely between staffer types; 
that is, the proportion of staffing resources committed to each position group increased 
at roughly the same rates. Since this time, however, staffer types have diverged 
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significantly in ways that could be instructive to our understanding of recent partisan 
gridlock in the legislative process. Since 2006, all four primary staffer types have 
diverged significantly from each other, with administrative, policy, and senior staff 
remaining largely stagnant or even decreasing since 2001, while the number of 
communications staff has grown by nearly 75%. 
Figure 5.2. House committee staffer types over time, percent change, percent change 
from 2001 totals 
 
 Given such sharp increases in the number of communications committee staff 
combined with the stagnation in senior and policy staffer totals indicated by Figure 5.2, 
it may not be so surprising that the committee process has resulted in less overall 
legislative success in recent years. The changes of distribution of staff within 
committees over the last several Congresses appears to be yet another indicator of the 
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preeminence of parties and party leaders in the committee process. When partisan 
messaging is prioritized over bipartisan legislative accomplishment (Lee 2009), staffing 
decisions reflect that prioritization of communications. That this dynamic appears to 
have leaked into the committee process, the advantages of which are supposed to come 
from division of legislative and policy expertise rather than political and communications 
expertise, is an indicator that congressional committees are becoming more focused on 
policy and political messaging that legislative productivity. Reformers looking to use the 
committee structure to help improve this process, therefore, might do so in part by 
reversing the trends made clear by Figure 5.2. 
 
5.3.1 Control Variables 
We also have incorporated a number of important controls that are likely to 
condition the legislative outputs achieved by any committee. First, we obtained counts 
of number of members per committee-year to help control for the possibility that 
committees with more members would produce greater legislative output. Second, we 
use the Policy Agenda Project’s topic codes based on CQ Almanac publications and 
aggregated by committee-year to determine the number of major policy topics each 
committee addresses. This variable indicates which committees have wider policy 
jurisdictions, and thus, are in a better position to produce more of our outputs under 
consideration. Third, we include a dummy variable for instances in which the chair of 
the committee vacated the post within the year as well as the tenure length of the 
committee chair. Fourth, we include binary variables indicating whether there was a 
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unified Congress (both chambers of the same party) in that year, and whether it was an 
election year to account for House members being preoccupied with electoral politics 
rather than committee production. Fifth, we include a binary variable indicating 
whether a committee-specific authorization bill re-emerged that year, as these bills can 
consume much, if not all, of the committee’s attention and resources to secure its 
passage. Finally, we created a variable indicating exogenous policy shocks, which 
increase demand for legislative and hearing outputs.50 
In order to hold as much committee-specific variation constant as possible, we 
employ conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression to predict per-year counts 
of important bills reported out of committee, important committee-reported bills that 
passed the chamber, and committee hearings held. The effects measured by these 
models will therefore capture variation only within each committee itself to ensure that 
member- or committee-specific variables cloud the results. Full descriptive statistics of 
key variables can be found below in Table 5.1 and a detailed explanation of each 
variable and its source data can be found in Table A.5.5 located in the Appendix. 
  
                                             
 
50 For example, the House Homeland Security Committee, which is in charge of FEMA’s budget, was given 
a positive value for this variable in 2005 and 2006, when and shortly after Hurricane Katrina devastated 
the Gulf Coast; similarly, the House Financial Services Committee was given the same designation during 
and following the financial crisis of 2008-2009.  
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Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics for key variables 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. 
Imp. Bills Reported from Cmte. 16 22.4 0 143 
Imp. Cmte. Bills Passed Chamber 11 15.1 0 91 
Number of Hearings Held 50 30.1 0 164 
Total Staff 67 33.1 25 160 
Policy Staff 24 16.4 3 84 
Communications Staff 5 2.6 0 18 
Administrative Staff 14 8.4 1 52 
Senior Staff 10 5.7 1 25 
Unified Congress 0.7 0.5 0 1 
Election Year 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Cmte. Chair Turnover 0.0 0.2 0 2 
Cmte. Chair Tenure Length 1.7 1.5 0 7 
Cmte. Size (Members) 47 14.5 9 82 
Exogenous Policy Shock 0.08 0.3 0 1 
Cmte. Authorization Year 0.03 0.2 0 1 




As previously stated, we ran a number of different models to capture the differences 
expected by our three hypotheses. First, we ran fixed-effects negative binomial 
regressions on each of our measures of legislative output in all House committees to 
assess Hypothesis 1, which predicted that increases in total staff support of all types 
would lead to increases in legislative output. Table 5.2 shows the raw regression results 
of these models for each of our three measures of output. 
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N 254 254 254 
Note: Results found using conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression. 
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p <.01 
 
 These results are a clear confirmation of Hypothesis 1. All three measures are 
positively affected by total staff support, with important legislation reported and 
important legislation passed chamber reaching statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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The coefficients also tell us about substantive significance. For example, according to 
our model, a 50% increase51 in the total staff support a committee results in a 43% 
increase in the amount of important legislation reported out of that committee, and a 
35% increase in committee legislation that passed the chamber as a whole. It also 
results in a 7% increase in the number of hearings held in that calendar year. Clearly, 
having more staff support matters across the board in terms of producing legislative 
output from committees and successfully passing it. Figure 5.3 plots the predicted 
increases in committee outputs resulting from a 50% increase in committee staff 
support. 
                                             
 
51 Due to non-normal distributions of our primary independent variables - committee staff counts - we 
have taken the natural logarithm of these variables to capture percent change rather than per-staffer 
change for more accurate specification, even distribution, and generalizability of results. We also do this 
because one additional staffer is likely to have a different effect in a committee that already has 70 
staffers, as opposed to one that only has 10. Similarly, we also use the original interpretation of the 
coefficients, which is to predict percentage change in the legislative outputs dependent variables. We do 
so because each committee produces different average counts of legislation, average predicted counts 
across all committees would be a non-intuitive measure. This allows us to standardize causes and effects 
across committees to a greater extent, which is particularly valuable in a fixed-effects model that captures 
within-committee variation.  
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Figure 5.3. Effects of 50% increase in committee staff support on committee outputs 
 
 Hypothesis 1, however, reflects a weakness in previous work on both 
congressional committees and congressional staff: that all staff are created equal in 
terms of their expertise. Our findings that accompany Hypotheses 2 and 3 aim to rectify 
this mistake by breaking down our primary independent variables by staff type. For 
these tests, we substituted total staff support variable for counts of the four 
substantively important groups of staffers by committee (policy, communications, 
administrative, and senior staff) to demonstrate the differential effects. Table 5.3 shows 
the raw regression results of these models for each of our three measures of output. 
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N 254 254 254 
Note: Results found using conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression. 
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p <.01 
 
In these results, we first find confirmation of Hypothesis 2: that higher numbers 
of policy staffers are particularly conducive to early-stage legislative output—in this 
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case, the amount of important legislation reported out of committee. The results 
indicate that a 50% increase in policy staff predict a 17% increase in legislative output 
from a committee. Policy staff influence is also apparent in the results for the amount of 
committee legislation that passes the chamber, but the result is not statistically 
significant, and likely just reflects residual effects from the first “committee reported” 
dependent variable, which is a prerequisite for the second. These results confirm the 
suspicions reflected in Hypothesis 2: that staffing expertise in the policy/legislative 
realm is most valuable at the initial stages of the legislative process, in crafting quality 
enough legislation to reach the next stage. 
The results in Table 5.3 also confirm Hypothesis 3: that the experience and 
multifaceted expertise provided by senior staffers lead to higher policy output at all 
points in the legislative process. In this case, a 50% increase the number of senior staff 
lead to about a 15% increase in each of the three committee outputs we model and 
each reaching statistical significance at the 0.10 level or better. These results are 
consistent with our expectations for senior staffers in that they have consistent impacts 
on productivity driven by multifaceted expertise and leadership in both policy and 
political spheres on the Hill; extended social and political networks that enable them to 
organize support for legislative priorities; and that their prior experience shepherding 
through legislation gives them a better intuition for what legislation should be debated 
in a hearing or reported out of committee based on what has the best chance of 
passing. 
 145 
Figure 5.4. Effects of 50% increase in staff support by position groupings on committee 
outputs 
 
Interestingly, Table 5.3 and Figure 5.4 also show that senior staffers heavily 
impact the number of hearings held by committees. While not explicitly hypothesized, 
this finding aligns strongly with our theoretical expectations. The public event of the 
committee hearing is the final presentation of the work conducted by staffers weeks 
and months prior. As previously theorized, senior staffers, by virtue of their extended 
networks, tenures, and expertise, are in the best position to recognize the policy and 
political implications hearings offer, and are responsible for aligning the work of the 
committee’s policy and communications staff to carry out necessary research and 
preparation. More specifically, senior staff lead negotiations between the committee 
chair and ranking member as to the needs and topics of hearings, as well as specifics 
such as scope, potential witnesses, and lines of questioning. Moreover, these senior 
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aides are the most likely to have been granted discretion by committee leaders and 
members to work on the committee’s behalf while members are fulfilling the other 
numerous aspects of their elected office. Just as senior staff manage committee efforts 
for the reporting and passing of important legislation, these senior aides also influence 
the production of committee hearings, another important, and public, committee 
output. 
 Finally, the results presented in Table 5.3 show that communications staffers 
also produce substantive and statistically significant increases (p<0.05) in the numbers 
of important legislation reported and important legislation passed the chamber. These 
findings suggest that communications aides generate and capitalize on public narratives 
or policy windows in which a committees’ legislative proposals can be characterized as 
viable solutions (Kingdon 1984), or as winning messaging plays by the majority party 
(Lee 2016). By making use of their skills and media contacts, communications staffers 
provoke positive media coverage of member and party-desired committee actions—
such as framing a controversial policy proposal as a justified course of action—thereby 
increasing public demand and acceptance for the action to ultimately occur. More 
fundamentally, the effects of communications staffers on a committee’s legislative 
productivity found in this chapter suggest a strong committee media presence helps 
facilitate their being out of committee and being passed by the chamber. 
On the whole, our results shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 confirm our theoretical 
expectations discussed earlier: not only that staffers generally can help increase 
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legislative productivity, but that this productivity also depends on the type of staffer 
deployed at different points in the legislative process.  
5.5 Discussion 
These results presented in this chapter should encourage congressional scholars and 
reformers to consider not just how staff can improve legislative productivity, but which 
types of staff are most likely to be successful at these efforts. Our results indicate not 
only that committee staffers have positive effects on legislative output in the chamber 
in a general sense, but that meeting particular staffing needs at different points in the 
legislative process can and does exponentiate these effects. At the same time, the 
trends suggested by our data and Figure 5.2 suggest the reality that if granted the 
increased committee staffing resources for which many reformers are advocating, 
committees are likely to put them towards communications rather than policy positions. 
 These findings comport with theories put forward in earlier chapters in this 
volume that point out not a simple need for greater capacity to accomplish legislative 
goals in Congress (as we find in our first Hypothesis), but that reformers should also 
consider more diverse applications of this capacity in the attempt to maximize 
legislative productivity and quality.52 Over the course of the last several decades, the 
responsibilities of the federal government, and of Congress in particular, have grown in 
both size and complexity (Sinclair 1989, 2016), while at the same time a great deal of 
                                             
 
52 See Chapter 1 (Drutman and LaPira), and Chapter 2 (Baumgartner and Jones) within the edited volume 
in particular. 
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congressional action has been crippled by partisan gridlock (Layman and Carsey 2002; 
Theriault 2008) and increased competition between the two major parties for majority 
control (Lee 2016). Our findings in particular demonstrate that different types of staffers 
with distinct expertise are necessary to navigate both the new legislative complexities 
that Congress must face, as well as the political ones.  
These parallel responsibilities that Congress is expected to address are often in 
conflict with each other: ideal policy goals are political untenable to enough lawmakers 
to gain passage, and partisan political goals are thwarted by the reality of a diverse, 
complex nation with both old and emerging policy problems. Elected representatives 
are the embodiment of this conflict, often pulled in different directions by policy and 
political priorities alike. But at the committee level, legislative success can happen only 
when these differing goals converge not just in the individual, but between lawmakers.  
The findings in this chapter demonstrate that congressional staff members at the 
committee level are well-suited to facilitate this convergence. Staffers, with their 
particular issue expertise and talents, can use their individual types of experience to 
enhance the chances of passing substantive legislation that serves the policy and 
political needs of both members and constituents. Policy staffers can use their issue 
expertise to create quality legislation within the committee; and senior staffers can 
work alongside them to anticipate political complexities and put the legislation in the 
best position to succeed, not just at the committee level, but at the chamber level as 
well. As for the committee structure at large, this division of responsibility is clearly 
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assists in passing substantive legislation, and particularized staffing resources help solve 




Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
 
No matter the time or occasion, it is rare to see a member of Congress without any staff 
following a half a step behind the boss, hands full of phones and binders, ready to assist. 
As elected representatives, members face a list of job demands far too long to check off 
themselves and have long turned to hired aides for assistance in doing so. 
Consequently, lawmakers, journalists, and academics alike regularly identify 
congressional staff as a primary institutional resource who are imperative to the 
functioning of individual member-offices, congressional committees, and Congress as an 
institution. After all, for nearly every action taken by a member of Congress—from a 
vote on the House floor to a speech given in the district to setting up meetings with 
important stakeholders—staff are involved, scheduling, researching, writing, advising.  
But, despite the acknowledgement of staff importance from those who know the 
Hill best, these behind-the-scenes-aides remain behind-the-scenes far too often. 
Particularly in recent decades, very little scholarly attention has been devoted to the 
vital support roles played by hired staffers, from casework to drafting and advancing 
policy proposals. It is a puzzling dynamic: observers know and admit staff are imperative 
to each congressional office, personal and committee, yet most still treat members as 
unitary actors rather than heads of an enterprise employing over a dozen aides who are 
responsible for much of the work in the member’s name. As a result, though with a few 
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important exceptions, (e.g., McCrain 2018a; Montgomery and Nyhan 2017) the roles, 
characteristics, and impacts of staff in the modern congressional environment remain 
largely unknown and unquantified.  
This dissertation addresses some of the literature’s lingering questions, even 
misconceptions, regarding how members make use of their staffing resources and the 
ultimate effects aides have within personal and committee offices. To fully understand 
why and how Congress works the way it does, staff must be a part of the discussion. By 
focusing on member use and the impacts of the thousands of congressional aides, this 
dissertation contributes to a more informed understanding of congressional operations, 
member motives and behaviors, and policymaking in Congress.  
I began the study by detailing the legislative and congressional reform efforts 
that increased and institutionalized staffing resources available to members. I also 
detailed the high levels of agency members enjoy regarding staffing decisions within 
their personal offices via the Members’ Representational Allowance (MRA). Additionally, 
I provided a rare empirical look into modern day staff patterns within the House of 
Representatives, including the degrees to which members vary in how they allocate 
their appropriated funds to different functions, such as constituent service and policy 
positions.  
But, the true contributions of this dissertation come from both the scope of 
staffer-level data used and the quantitative tests and results the data help produce. 
Using such authoritative sources as official House statements of disbursements and the 
Congressional Yellowbook, often going back to as early as 2001, this study provides 
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empirically-grounded insights to the use and impact of staffers on three important 
staffing topics that congressional observers have, to-date, left unsubstantiated: 
measures of staffer experience and expertise; turnover of aides and its impact; and the 
effects of different types of aides on various committee outputs. 
6.1 Longer tenures isn’t the only valued form of staffer expertise 
As in any other professions, some employees become known to be better at their job 
than most others. Congress is no different. While much of the journalistic and scholarly 
attention is spent identifying and explaining which members are the most effective in 
their roles, numerous articles and observational studies have highlighted instances in 
which staffers have earned a reputation as a true source of expertise (e.g., Malbin 
(1980). These accounts of influential staffers are quick to point to the years of service as 
a main reason why a particular aide has earned such a reputation; longer tenured aides 
are said to have developed issue area expertise because of their years of experience. 
Though empirically unverified to-date, the expertise of a staffer is assumed to be solely 
generated from an aide’s length of service on the Hill. 
 In chapter 3, I argue that the proxy of tenure as expertise ignores the vital 
importance of, and the premium members place on, a staffer’s ability to generate 
collaborative information networks and coalitions. In the legislative context, it is one 
thing to master a single policy’s ins and outs but quite another to be able to identify 
political opportunities and drum up the support—inside and outside of Congress—
necessary to advance legislation. For policy aides responsible for issue areas on behalf of 
their member-boss, I suggest expertise can come in at least two different forms: longer 
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service on the Hill and wider networks operationalized by working in more 
congressional offices. 
 Ultimately, I find that members value both forms of expertise when deciding 
which of their policy staffers should be responsible for the House’s most prestigious and 
policy-laden issue areas. As expected, lawmakers value longer tenures on Capitol Hill for 
issues such as appropriations, foreign affairs, and taxes. But, I show that members also 
seek more networked aides to handle these important legislative responsibilities, and 
often do so over aides with longer tenures. These findings demonstrate that staff with 
wider networks, deeper ties to interest groups, and connections to more congressional 
offices maintain a different, yet necessary, form of expertise that benefits their bosses’ 
coverage on the issues.  
By being the first to leverage issue portfolios of House policy staffers, this study 
shows that members value in their staffers what observers know to be important 
aspects of policymaking and politics, in general: contacts and relationships. Altogether, 
in showing that members value both more tenured and networked aides—sometimes 
independently of each other—for certain legislative assignments, chapter 3 offers 
insight into which characteristics contribute to staffers’ earning reputations inside and 
outside the chamber as ‘unelected issue leaders’ (Hammond 1996).  
6.2 Turnover isn’t as systemic as feared, but where it exists it has 
negative consequences 
The second empirical study within this dissertation analyzes one of the most pervasive 
normative concerns regarding congressional staffers: levels of staff turnover. Many fear 
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that lawmakers offices are made up of inexpert staffers who are soon to cash in on their 
Capitol Hill networks and experience for more lucrative positions as lobbyists or 
consultants. Consequently, observers caution that much of the work done in Congress, 
including writing legislation, is executed by novice staffers who depart after short stints, 
ultimately depleting the institutional memory necessary for the body to efficiently and 
effectively function. As put by one congressional reporter, staff turnover is thought to 
be so bad, “The most powerful nation on Earth is run largely by 24-year olds.”53 
 In chapter 4, I draw on the economics and business management literatures to 
theorize why members with higher levels of salary weighted collective turnover—that is, 
the proportion of staff salaries within a lawmakers’ office that depart each year—are 
likely to be less active and successful in producing and advancing policy. Using a novel 
dataset of officially reported statements of disbursements submitted to the House Chief 
Administrative Officer, I provide the first longitudinal empirical analysis of collective 
turnover rates for every member of Congress since 2001 and test the impacts that 
higher rates of turnover have on legislative productivity and effectiveness. 
Two important findings result. First, concerningly high rates of salary weighted 
turnover are far less systematic than many observers caution. Most offices experience 
healthy rates of staff replacement with about 20 percent of its office salaries departing 
in any given year, a percentage on par or lower than most other private sector 
                                             
 
53 Luke Rosiak, “Congressional staffers, public shortchanged by high turnover, low pay.” The Washington 
Times. June 6, 2012. Available at, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/6/congressional-
staffers-public-shortchanged-by-high/  
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industries. Second, I show that when offices do experience higher proportions of 
salaries that turnover, members are less effective policymakers. Results from stringent 
within-member models demonstrate that lawmakers who experience a higher 
proportion of salaries that depart the member’s office are both less legislatively active 
and less successful ushering substantive bills through the various stages of the 
legislative process. Put directly, members constantly hiring new aides face a 
comparative disadvantage compared to their House colleagues who lead and maintain 
more stable offices.  
In addition to its data advances, this chapter provides strong evidence of 
member-dependence on staff to carry out legislative duties expected of them as 
Representatives and contributes to our understanding of the role of staff in creating and 
advancing public policies within Congress. Further, this chapter provides a much needed 
empirical context to the popular normative caution often found in the growing 
congressional capacity literature that staff turnover ultimately leads to more executive 
branch and special interest influence. Given the results from this chapter, 
recommendations for improving the congressional staffer work environment may 
benefit from knowing that turnover may not be as pervasive as often portrayed, but 
when levels are high, lawmakers, their policy effectiveness, and the institution are all 
negatively impacted. 
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6.3 More than policy staff is needed to get committee bills 
reported and passed 
The final empirical chapter of this dissertation focuses on staffing resources within 
congressional committees. Largely by virtue of their more focused jurisdictions, many 
academics, Hill veterans, and journalists characterize committees as repositories of issue 
area expertise not only because members are able to specialize, but because they are 
staffed with longer tenured aides devoted to the committee’s topics. Particularly within 
the congressional capacity literature, committee policy aides are framed as the true 
drivers of a committee’s legislative productivity; that if Congress only had more policy 
experts on committees, a greater number of sound policy proposals would break 
through the polarized institution and be signed into law. 
 Within chapter 5, I argue that most scholarly and journalistic accounts paint 
committee aides with too broad of a brush. I theorize that though committee aides are 
crucial drivers of legislative productivity for the committees for which they work, not all 
committee aides are created equal; they are not a singular resource responsible for the 
same tasks. Instead, different types of committee staffers affect different committee 
outputs at different stages of the policy process. Using a novel dataset of all committee 
staffers job titles within each House committee from 2001-2017, I assess the extent to 
which increases in staff resources drive legislative productivity and which types of 
staffers are most consequential in these efforts. 
 I demonstrate that increases in committee staff support result in substantive and 
statistically significant increases in three measures of common committee outputs: 
number of important bills reported out of committee; number of important bills that 
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pass the House; and the number of committee hearings held. Though an important 
finding, highlighting the impacts of more staff tells us little about which staff are 
responsible for producing which outputs. By delineating job titles into specific position 
groupings, I show that the type of committee productivity is contingent on aides with 
specific responsibilities and expertise. Policy staffers, for example, are crucial to the 
early legislative process of producing quality legislation that gets reported out of 
committee. But it is senior staffers plugged into more congressional offices and outside 
organizations who are the driving force behind their successful passage out of the 
chamber. 
 Findings presented in chapter 5 corroborate the widely-held assumption that 
staffers with issue area expertise are most able to develop policies that move through 
the legislative process. Additionally, the chapter identifies an important overlooked 
element in our understanding of congressional committees, their staffing resources, and 
ultimate productivity: certain staffers, because of their job responsibilities and specific 
skill sets, are more impactful at different stages of the policymaking process. Those 
concerned with the level of staffing resources available to congressional committees— 
particularly in an era of concentrated power within leadership offices—would be wise to 
heed the finding that the type of committee staff matters. Allocating the right staff at 
the right time is vital. 
6.4 Concluding thoughts 
The theories and results presented within this dissertation are some of the first few 
steps towards empirically quantifying the impacts of congressional staff on member 
 158 
decisions and policy outcomes within Congress. In previous decades—following 
increased staffing resources being allocated to individual members to cope with their 
increasing demands—scholars paid particular attention to the roles and importance of 
staffers in efforts to explain policymaking processes that largely took place behind-the-
scenes. At the time, scholars suggested that the influence of particular aides on policy 
outcomes was being overlooked, and in order to provide the most complete explanation 
of how Capitol Hill worked, staff warranted more study. I argue the same is true today. 
Members are incredibly busy, and thus, depend heavily on their hired hands to 
help them execute the many functions of their office in their name. From writing policy 
to facilitating committee hearings, congressional aides are constantly involved. Yet, 
despite their involvement, congressional staff remain largely discounted in favor of the 
member. As scholars, we know staff matter, but we are just beginning to quantify how, 
how much, and when.  
Findings from this dissertation offer new and intriguing answers to important 
staffer-related questions. But, they also produce more questions that future research 
should investigate to gain a more informed understanding into the legislative 
enterprises of Congress. Most notably, this dissertation does not examine the many 
potential interesting questions regarding the number one staffer frustration with the 
congressional work experience: pay. Among other lines of pay-related inquiries, future 
research should detail how increased staffer pay impacts the tenure lengths of aides, if 
better pay results in a more satisfactory work environment, and how it affects the 
number of staff that depart for lobbying shops upon leaving the Hill.  
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Also unstudied in this dissertation are Senate aides, and their similarities and 
differences to House staffers. Gender gaps in positions, pay, and policy portfolios, 
especially across chambers and political parties also merit study.  Importantly, individual 
staffer level data is becoming more and more available to scholars and good-
government researchers. Increased data availability and new statistical techniques will 
greatly advance our understanding of staff impacts on member decisions, Hill processes, 
and policymaking in Congress. And, of course, qualitative research from the member-
perspective will help inform scholars of exactly what members look for in their aides, 
how much leeway certain aides have in making decisions on behalf of the member, and 
how lawmakers vary in running their legislative enterprises. 
Admittedly, the topic of congressional staffing is a narrow one, even to scholars 
who study Congress and its processes. After all, most know members need their staff, 
and each office has some policy staff and several aides located in the district to work on 
constituent issues and requests. For many observers, that is enough. It is my hope that 
this dissertation begins to convince readers that there is far more to know about staff 
and their impacts. Capitol Hill would look far different without its thousands of 





Chapter 3 Appendix 
Table A.3.1. Frequency of staffer job titles assigned minimum of one legislative 
responsibility 
Title of Policy Aide Freq. Percent Cum. Percent 
Legislative Assistant 609 30.18 30.18 
Legislative Director 325 16.11 46.28 
Legislative Correspondent 128 6.34 52.63 
Senior Legislative 
Assistant 
104 5.15 57.78 
Chief of Staff 83 4.11 61.89 
Legislative Counsel 50 2.48 64.37 
Legislative Aide 46 2.28 66.65 
Deputy Chief of 
Staff/Legislative Director 
45 2.23 68.88 
Staff Assistant 34 1.68 70.56 
Deputy Chief of Staff 33 1.64 72.2 
Senior Policy Advisor 32 1.59 73.79 
Military Legislative  
Assistant 
24 1.19 74.98 
Legislative Fellow 21 1.04 76.02 
Scheduler 20 0.99 77.01 
Communications Director 18 0.89 77.9 




11 0.55 78.99 








Table A.3.2. Legislative responsibilities and their committees of jurisdiction 




Armed Services Armed Services 
Budget Budget 
Commerce Energy and Commerce 
Defense Armed Services 
Education Education and Workforce 
Energy Energy and Commerce 
Environment Energy and Commerce 
Financial Services Financial Services 
Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs 
Healthcare Education and Workforce 
Homeland Security Homeland Security 
Housing Financial Services 
Immigration Judiciary 
Intelligence Intelligence 
Judiciary Issues Judiciary 
Labor Education and Workforce 
LGTBQ Issues Judiciary 
Medicaid Energy and Commerce 
Medicare Energy and Commerce 
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Natural Resources Natural Resources 
Postal Issues Oversight 
Science/Technology Science and Technology 
Small Business Issues Small Business 
Social Security Ways and Means 
Taxes Ways and Means 
Telecommunications Energy and Commerce 
Trade Energy and Commerce 
Transportation/Infrastructure Transportation and Infrastructure 
Veterans' Affairs Veterans' Affairs 





Table A.3.3. Logistic regression results for each legislative responsibility 

















































































































































































































































Notes: Dependent variable is each individual legislative responsibility. Coefficients 
found using logistic regression with standard errors clustered at the member level. 




Chapter 4 Appendix 






Chapter 5 Appendix 
Table A.5.1. Staff classification by job title: regular expression initial keywords54 
Policy   Communications   Administrative   Senior Staff 
Legislative  Communications  Administrative  Chief of Staff 
Policy  Press  Staff Assistant  Leader 
Research  Media  Scheduler  Staff Director 
Counsel  Social  Accountant   
Legal  Writer  Clerk   
Adviser  Photog  Intern   
Analyst  Specialist  Page   
Investigative  Public Liaison  Parking   
Fellow  Radio  Professional Assistant  
Economist  Television  Receptionist   
Health  Community  Office Manager   
Budget  Outreach  Office Administrator  
Appropriatio
n  Speech  Assistant to Rep   
Grants    Assistant to Sen   
National 
Security    Executive Assistant  
    Systems   
    Information Tech   
    Network   










                                             
 
54 Many of these regular expressions captured elements of multiple staff types (about 20% of those that 
were captured overall). We sorted these overlapping job titles and manually coded those appearing most 
frequently, cutting the proportion of overlapping titles down to about 2% of all captured titles. These 






Table A.5.2. Resulting staff grouping examples by title55 
Policy   Communications   Administrative   Senior Staff 
Legislative Director  Communications Director Office Manager  Chief of Staff 
Legislative Assistant  Press Secretary  Scheduler  Deputy Chief of Staff 
Legislative Correspondent Deputy Press Secretary Financial Administrator  Staff Director 









Digital Media Manager  
Director of Information 
Technology  
Policy Coordinator  Social Media Manager Systems/Network Administrator  
Clerk  New Media Manager  Staff Assistant   
Research Assistant  Web Manager     




                                             
 
55 Over the 2001-2017 time period, there were just over 2,000 unique job titles given to committee 
staffers. This list is therefore not exhaustive, but represents a sample of the most common titles. Many 
were variations on common titles (i.e. Legislative Assistant/Analyst/Associate/Aide, Chief/Assistant Policy 
Counsel, Digital Media Director/Manager, etc.) 
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N 244 244 243 
Notes: Results found using conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression. The 
dependent variable (staff counts) is lagged by one year). 
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N 244 244 243 
Notes: Results found using conditional fixed-effects negative binomial regression. The staff 
position grouping dependent variables are lagged by one year. 




Table A.5.5. Explanation and data sources of key variables  
Variable Explanation 
Imp. Bills Reported 
from Cmte. 
Count of substantively "important" bills reported out of committee 
per committee-year from Adler and Wilkinson’s (2006) 
“Congressional Bills Project 
Imp. Cmte. Bills Passed 
Chamber 
Count of substantively "important" bills reported out of committee 
passed by chamber per committee-year from Adler and Wilkinson’s 
(2006) “Congressional Bills Project 
Number of Hearings 
Held 
Count of number of hearings per committee-year from Adler and 
Wilkinson’s (2006) “Congressional Bills Project 
Total Staff Count of Total Staff per committee-year from LegiStorm 
congressional staff employment database/House Statements of 
Disbursements 
Policy Staff Count of Policy Staff per committee-year based on job titles from 
LegiStorm congressional staff employment database/House 
Statements of Disbursements 
Communications Staff Count of Communications Staff per committee-year based on job 
titles from LegiStorm congressional staff employment 
database/House Statements of Disbursements 
Administrative Staff Count of Administrative Staff per committee-year based on job titles 
from LegiStorm congressional staff employment database/House 
Statements of Disbursements 
Senior Staff Count of Senior Staff per committee-year based on job titles from 
LegiStorm congressional staff employment database/House 
Statements of Disbursements 
Unified Congress Dummy variable (House and Senate majorities of same party=1) 
Election Year Dummy variable (year of election=1) 
Cmte. Chair Turnover 
Dummy variable (committee chair turned over within committee-
year=1) 
Cmte. Chair Tenure 
Length Tenure length (years) as chair of committee chair 
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Cmte. Size (Members) Count of committee members per committee-year 
Exogenous Policy Shock Dummy variable (committee responded with important legislation in 
response to exogenous shock in a given year=1), examples include 
recovery funds out of Homeland Sec. Committee after Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 and 2006 
Cmte. Authorization 
Year 
Dummy variable (committee-specific authorization bill passed=1), 
examples include Farm Bill for Ag. Committee and NDAA for Armed 
Services 
Cmte. Jurisdiction 
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